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COMMENTS
CAST ADRIFT: HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL,
ALCOHOLIC AND DRUG ADDICTED
In the 1980s, both government and the public recognized the need to
address the lack of housing that confronts vulnerable segments of the
population.1 Such efforts, however, have resulted in mere indiscriminate
warehousing of the homeless, regardless of the particular needs of differ-
ent groups within the homeless population.' With decreasing public and
private funds3 and sagging public sympathy,4 private and public shelter
and service providers increasingly focus their efforts on those groups that
are easiest to assist.5 Simultaneously, localities attempt to hide the gen-
eral homeless population by relying on law enforcement6 and by limiting
1. Robert Collier, Everybody's Problem: How Cities Around the Country Are Dealing
With The Homeless, S.F. CHRON., July 5, 1992, at 10.
2. Id.; ALIcE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BURNES, A NATION IN DENIAL: THE TRUTH
ABOUT HomELEssNmSS 74-75 (1993).
3. See BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 108; Collier, supra note 1, at 13.
4. See Baum & Burnes, supra note 2, at 108; Collier, supra note 1, at 13; see also
Larry Rohter, Homelessness Defies Every City's Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, sec. 4,
at 3.
5. Such groups include families and individuals homeless for the first time due to
economic hardship or abusive situations. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 5, 81-82; Col-
lier, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Such enforcement results in harassment. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the City's policy of arresting the homeless
for "performing essential, life-sustaining acts in public when they have absolutely no place
to go effectively infringes on their fundamental right to travel in violation of the equal
protection clause"). During a three-year period, the City arrested homeless persons for
misdemeanors such as standing, sleeping or sitting on sidewalks, sleeping in public, and
loitering or prowling, resulting in approximately 3,500 arrests. Id. at 1559-60. The City's
police force raided parks, where they arrested the homeless and confiscated and destroyed
their personal property. Id.; see also Frances Schwartzkopff & Kathy Scruggs, Atlanta
Homeless Jailed When Company Comes?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 18, 1993, at B2
(revealing that police arrested the homeless to sweep them off the streets days before large
conventions began); Jenifer Warren, Compassionate S.F Turns Cool to Homeless, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at Al (noting that the Mayor of San Francisco launched a crackdown
on the homeless, resulting in over 400 arrests for crimes in less than 30 days and that such
"get-tough" strategies are becoming more popular in cities throughout the country).
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shelter sites and services.7 This results in further segregation8 and clus-
tering9 of the homeless population.
The need for housing is particularly acute for homeless persons who
suffer from disabilities10 such as mental illness," alcoholism,' 2 drug ad-
7. Collier, supra note 1, at 10 (noting two aspects of the response to the homeless: "to
target expanded social services to the most salvageable homeless, making shelters more
upscale and selective; and to attempt, through a combination of tougher policing policies
and neglect, to push the majority of the homeless, those with the most intractable
problems, out of sight").
8. See id.; see also Robert Franklin, City Opposes Homeless Shelter Site, STAR TRIB.,
May 4, 1993, at 7B, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Don't Site All
Homeless Shelters in Poverty Areas, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk), Aug. 20, 1992, at 60,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
9. Shelters have been placed in poorer, often minority, neighborhoods, which previ-
ously were the path of least resistance. Santiago O'Donnell, Welcome Mat Not Out For
Many Projects, L.A. TIMEs (Ventura Co.), Oct. 20, 1991, at B1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ARCNWS File; Home for the Homeless, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., July 26, 1993,
at B6.
10. Ellen Baxter & Kim Hopper, Troubled on the Streets: The Mentally Disabled
Homeless Poor, in THE CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENT: FIvE YEARS LATER 56 (John A. Tal-
bott ed., 1984); Deborah L. Dennis et al., A Decade of Research and Services for Homeless
Mentally Ill Persons: Where Do We Stand, 46 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1129 (1991). The
reported numbers of homeless persons who suffer from mental illness, substance addiction
and AIDS vary. A 1992 report of the National Conference of Mayors found that 29% of
homeless persons are mentally ill, 40% are substance addicted, and 7% are HIV positive.
Collier, supra note 1, at 10. The report also noted that such categories are not mutually
exclusive. Id. Others have found the numbers to be significantly higher. Id.
According to a 1993 Homeless Population Profile of Dade County Florida, 30 to 40% of
homeless persons are severely mentally ill; 25 to 30% suffer from chronic substance abuse;
and 15 to 25% are infected with HIV. Dade County Task Force on the Homeless, Dade
County Community Homeless Plan, June 1993, at Exhibit F. Others place the number of
mentally ill homeless at one-third of the homeless population. Dennis, supra, at 1129.
Boston's 1991 census found 3,893 homeless persons and its city officials estimate that in
1992, 1,200 of the homeless population were mentally ill. Jordana Hart, On Bitter Night,
Boston Counts Its Homeless, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1992, at 31, 36.
11. Lack of housing for the significantly mentally ill who are subject to a continual
cycle of commitment and discharge from mental hospitals and facilities, only to face the
instability of life on the streets, results in less hope for stabilization and rehabilitation. See
Baxter & Hopper, supra note 10, at 56; Dennis, supra note 10, at 1134; Ronald W. Powell,
Among the Mentally Ill Street People, Fred is That Rare Victory, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Feb. 23, 1992, at B-6.
12. For persons who suffer from substance addiction, recovery in a stable and clean
environment without temptation is paramount. See United States v. Borough of Audubon,
797 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991). A former resident of a group home for recovering sub-
stance abusers testified that she needed "'a place that [she] could go home to without
alcohol and drugs, where there wasn't going to be a bar on the corner, someplace that I
can't, didn't know and had a chance to stay sober in.'" Id. at 358-59. She also stated that a
supportive environment was necessary because " 'when you need somebody to talk to, you
need another recovering alcoholic or addict to talk to; a normal person that doesn't know
addiction or recovery wouldn't understand some of the problems that we go through.'"
Id. at 359. As the court stated in Easter Seals Soc. v. Township of North Bergen:
"'[w]ithout proper care, supervision and peer support each [plaintiff] could easily suffer a
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diction,' 3 and HIV or AIDS. 14 For the homeless disabled, access to shel-
ters and services is the first step toward permanent, stable housing in
small group homes and, eventually, to independent living arrangements. 5
Yet, a major obstacle to the provision of shelters and services for the
homeless disabled population is community opposition to services for the
homeless in general.' 6 Increasingly, local officials respond to community
opposition by directly or indirectly controlling the placement of such
shelters and services. 7 The underlying policies and concerns of the local
relapse. For these alcoholics, a relapse threatens not only a potentially irremediable rever-
sion to chronic alcohol abuse but immediate physical harm or death.'" Easter Seals Soc'y
v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp, 228, 237 (D.N.J. 1992) (quoting Sullivan v.
Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987)). The Easter
Seals court "previously... had occasion to conclude that interference with the establish-
ment of a functioning community residence for recovering chemical abusers threatens
those individuals with the irreparable harm of a relapse." Id.
13. See supra note 12. For those who suffer from both mental illness and substance
addiction, the need for a dwelling is overwhelming. See Easter Seals, 798 F. Supp. at 237;
see infra note 54 (discussing facts and holding of Easter Seals).
14. For those with HIV or AIDS, affordable and appropriate housing is a critical need.
Felicia R. Lee, Cuts Set Off Debate Helping Homeless with AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21,
1995, at B1 (discussing the debate set off by proposed cuts to the Department of Housing
and Urban Development housing program for persons with AIDS, noting that one-third to
one-half of all persons with AIDS are either homeless or are in imminent danger of home-
lessness and that such persons need supportive housing which provides medical care, drug
treatment and assistance with housekeeping and personal care); see also Stewart B. Mc-
Kinney Found., Inc. v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1202-03 (D.
Conn. 1992) (noting that evidence presented to the court revealed that "HIV-infected peo-
ple in Connecticut face serious shortages of housing .... Affordable, adequate, and appro-
priate housing is one of their most critical needs").
15. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 138 (arguing that one cause of homelessness is
society's refusal to recognize that homelessness flows, in significant part, from the reduc-
tion of services for the most severely disabled); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of
Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375,
415-16, 420 (1982) (arguing that the mentally ill homeless' need for housing cannot be
separated from their need for mental health treatment); Lucie White, Representing "The
Real Deal", 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 271, 278-79 (1990-91) (arguing that immediate access to
supportive housing is essential to the success of any homeless prevention program).
Rhoden notes that experts on homelessness have found that the mentally ill homeless need
decent shelter as much as mental health services "because their therapeutic and survival
needs are inseparable and because 'pathologies of place compound disorders of the
mind.'" Rhoden, supra, at 416 (footnote omitted).
16. Franklin, supra note 8, at 7B; David Gonzalez, Home and the Homeless: P.C.
Meets Nimby, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1992, L-41; Home for the Homeless, supra note 9, at B-
6; O'Donnell, supra note 9, at B1; Paul Toomey, Take It Out of Our Site, NEWSDAY
(Queens), Aug. 31, 1993, at 31, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
17. See Franklin, supra note 8, at 7B; Beverly Stewart, Church Outreach, Suburban
Zoning Often At Odds, CHi. TRm., Feb. 24, 1989, at C-8.
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governments, when making such decisions, rarely take into account the
detrimental impact on the homeless disabled population.'
8
One significant barrier to ensuring legal protection for homeless dis-
abled persons is the difficulty of determining whether community animus
is directed at the disabilities most common among the homeless or at the
class of homeless as a whole.' 9 A second obstacle is reduced willingness
of governmental bodies to provide services to those persons with certain
disabilities.2' As a result, a significant portion of this population com-
prises a high percentage of the homeless.2 An examination of the judi-
cial interpretation of the federal disability laws reveals that these disabled
persons, who become the most vulnerable disabled as a result of their
homeless status, have fallen through the cracks of the federal disability
laws.
This Comment focuses on the federal disabilities laws and the way in
which the courts have interpreted and applied them. Next, this Comment
demonstrates that the federal disabilities laws cover the homeless dis-
abled, the most vulnerable disabled class. This Comment then examines
the limitations of the federal disabilities laws as applied to challenging
governmental actions directed at homeless shelters and services. Finally,
this Comment argues that the federal disability laws do not offer relief
from discriminatory acts directed at services and shelters, thus toward
homeless disabled persons. This Comment asserts that the federal courts
must show greater sensitivity to the nature of homelessness as an out-
growth of the disability itself, and must recognize that animus towards
disabilities often is the root of what appears to be merely class animus
directed at the homeless population in general.
18. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 3-4, 87-88. Baum and Burnes argue that policy-
makers will not acknowledge or, at least, are unaware of both the mental illness and sub-
stance addiction among the homeless as well as the need to ensure access for the homeless
disabled to healthcare, therapy, and rehabilitation services. Id at 3, 87-88. They also ar-
gue that a primary cause of homelessness is not a lack of affordable housing, but a lack of
access to such services. Id at 3.
19. See SUSAN M. CHANDLER, COMEmTINo R.ALImEs: Tia CONTESTED TERRAIN OF
MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY 49 (1990); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Comment, Community
Mental Health Treatment for the Mentally Ill-When Does Less Restrictive Treatment Be-
come a Right?, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1971, 1974 (1992).
20. See Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1991); Williams v. Secretary of
the Executive Office of Human Serv., 609 N.E.2d 447, 453 (Mass. 1993); see also, BAUM &
BURNES, supra note 2, at 3-4 (noting that policymakers' approach to dealing with the
homeless is "selective," in that social remedies focus on those persons who are the easiest
to assist, yet ignore the homeless mentally ill and substance addicted and their need for
healthcare and rehabilitation needs).
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing the number of disabled
homeless comprising the homeless population).
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I. COVERAGE OF THE HOMELESS DISABLED POPULATION UNDER
FEDERAL DISABILITY LAWS
Three federal statutes theoretically provide the most significant protec-
tion to homeless persons with disabilities.' The Fair Housing Act of
1968, as amended in 1988, prohibits discrimination in the area of housing
on the basis of disability.23 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
prohibits discrimination in programs or services receiving federal assist-
ance. 4 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits discrimina-
tion in both the private and public sectors, regardless of receipt of federal
assistance.25
A. Fair Housing Act: Prohibiting Housing Discrimination
Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), it is unlawful to discriminate on
the basis of disability in the sale or rental of residential property.26 Fur-
thermore, it is unlawful "to otherwise make unavailable or deny" residen-
tial property to persons protected under the FHA.27 The persons with
22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 201,301, 104 Stat.
337, 353 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12181 (Supp. V 1993)); Rehabilitative Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504,87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)); Fair
Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3601-31 (1988)).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12181 (Supp. V 1993).
26. Congress amended the Fair Housing Act in 1988 to extend protection to persons
with disabilities. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 (1988) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988)). Consequently under the Fair Housing Act, it is
unlawful
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of-
(A) the buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so
sold, rented, or made available or,
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1).
The Fair Housing Act as amended in 1988 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
refer to persons with disabilities as persons with handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604; 29
U.S.C. § 794. Congress replaced the term "handicap" with the term "disabilities" in its
definition of protected persons in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 in response
to objections to the use of the term "handicap" as perpetuating stereotypes and patroniz-
ing attitudes towards persons with disabilities. Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimina-
tion on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. app. A to
pt. 35 (1994) (analyzing definitions found in 28 C.F.R. § 35.104); S. REP. No. 16, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989). Congress intended no substantive difference between the terms.
Id. This Comment uses the term "disability" in lieu of the statutory terms found in the Fair
Housing Act, as amended, and in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1).
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disabilities whom the FHA protects include buyers or renters, individuals
residing or intending to reside on the property, or individuals associated
with the renter or buyer.'
In addition, the FHA expressly prohibits acts that "coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere" with any individual's rights under the FHA as well
as such acts directed at others "having aided or encouraged" the exercise
or enjoyment of such rights.29 Finally, the FHA imposes an affirmative
duty to make reasonable accommodations to comply with the FHA's pro-
hibition against discriminatory effect.30 Refusal to comply with the
FHA's reasonable accommodation requirement is considered a discrimi-
natory act.3'
The federal courts aggressively enforce the FHA against government
officials who employ zoning schemes to deprive persons with disabilities
of housing.32 To date, the majority of FHA claims concern group homes
28. Id
29. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
30. A governmental body must "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see, e.g., United
States v. Commission of Puerto Rico & Regulations & Permit Admin., 764 F. Supp. 220,
224 (D.P.R. 1991) (holding that reasonable accommodation includes waiver of compliance
with certain zoning requirements).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
32. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 923 (4th Cir.
1992) (affirming injunction against real estate management company that had refused to
rent apartments to recovering substance abusers who were clients of a substance abuse
program); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1289
(D. Md. 1993) (holding that an "exceptional person" zoning rule resulted in disparate
treatment of elderly persons with disabilities and thus was a FHA violation); Support Min-
istries for Person with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 139 (N.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that the passage of a zoning ordinance that intended to prevent a group
home for persons with AIDS violated the FHA); City of Peekskill v. Rehabilitation Sup-
port Serv., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (supporting the denial of a motion
for a preliminary injunction against the establishment of a group home for homeless men-
tally ill persons by stating that "[p]reventing housing for disabled persons on the grounds
that the City has already provided its fair share... comes perilously close to violating the
Fair Housing Act" and is possibly "contrary to the recently enacted Americans with Disa-
bilities Act"); Horizon House Developmental Serv., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southamp-
ton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that a city ordinance's distance
requirement imposed upon group homes and passed in response to a proposed use of a
residence for persons with mental disabilities was facially discriminatory in violation of the
FHA), aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill,
799 F. Supp. 450, 452 (D.N.J. 1992) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the town-
ship from interfering with the immediate occupancy of a group home for recovering al-
coholics and substance abusers on the grounds that the home failed to meet the definition
of a "single family" under its zoning ordinance); Easter Seals Soc'y, Inc. v. North Bergen,
798 F. Supp. 228, 234 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that deviations from normal procedures and
substantive criteria in the permit process justified enjoining the town from further interfer-
ence with the establishment and operation of a group home for persons with mental illness
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for the homeless disabled or persons who risk homelessness because of
their disability.33
Direct evidence of intentional discrimination based on disability is not
always available, thus the federal courts apply an analytical framework,
comprised of two tests, which has evolved under race discrimination in
housing.' 4 The first test permits proof of intentional discrimination
through circumstantial evidence, as articulated in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.35 The second test
permits proof of discrimination by a showing of disparate impact, as ar-
ticulated in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.36
With regard to intentional discrimination cases, courts have found zon-
ing decisions to be discriminatory acts when they are intended to appease
private citizens holding discriminatory attitudes toward persons with disa-
bilities.37 Federal courts rely significantly on evidence of community ani-
coupled with substance abuse); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353,
359-60 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that local officials' repeated harassment of a group home for
recovering alcoholics and substance abusers through their issuance of zoning violations
justified injunctive relief); Stewart B. McKinney Found. v. Town Planning & Zoning
Comm., 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1220 (D. Conn. 1992) (granting a preliminary injunction where
a zoning commission based its decision that a group home for persons with AIDS required
a special use exception on community animus towards AIDS, and where that decision had
a disparate impact on persons with AIDS); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F.
Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding that a failure to grant an exception to a distance
requirement for a group home for persons with mental illness violated the FHA's reason-
able accommodation mandate); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 227
o(D.P.R. 1991) (granting a preliminary injunction where deviations from normal procedures
and substantive criteria in the zoning process were intended to prevent the establishment
of a group home for elderly persons with severe mental and physical disabilities); Associ-
ates of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F.
Supp. 95, 107 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding that a refusal to grant a special use permit was based
on illegal discrimination against persons with AIDS); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F.
Supp. 720, 734-35 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (granting a preliminary injunction against the City Coun-
cil's decision to deny a special use permit to a group home for persons with AIDS); Sulli-
van v. City of Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488, 1499-1500 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (granting a
preliminary injunction where deviations in the zoning process were intended to prevent the
establishment of a group home for recovering alcoholics), aff'd, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
33. See supra note 32 (citing cases involving zoning schemes).
34. See supra note 32 (citing cases that have employed the two tests).
35. 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see also United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560,
564 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing the circumstantial evidence that led to the trial court's find-
ing of intentional discrimination), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Stewart B. McKinney
Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1211 (listing the Arlington factors from which a discriminatory
purpose may be gleaned).
36. 844 F. 2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
37. As the court stated in Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regu-
lations & Permits Admin.,
a decisionmaker has a duty not to allow illegal prejudices of the majority to influ-
ence the decision making process. A racially discriminatory act would be no less
1995]
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mus to infer that the government's actions were an impermissible
response to community opposition."8 Furthermore, the courts uniformly
find it unnecessary for plaintiffs to show that some purposeful, malicious
desire to discriminate, nor the disability, itself, predominately motivated
the local government.39 A plaintiff must show only that the disability was
one motivating factor in the local government's decisions and actions.'
Courts also uniformly hold that evidence based solely upon the deroga-
tory or discriminatory comments of citizens is insufficient to prove the
discriminatory intent of local officials.41 Thus, the Arlington Heights test
intends to expose the government's underlying motivation by examining
the historical background of the government's decision, the sequence of
events leading to the decision, and the government's departure from nor-
illegal simply because it enjoys broad political support. Likewise, if an official act
is performed simply in order to appease the discriminatory viewpoints of private
parties, that act itself becomes tainted with discriminatory intent even if the deci-
sionmaker personally has no strong views on the matter.
Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin.,
740 F. Supp. 95, 104 (D.P.R. 1990) (emphasis omitted); see also Support Ministries for
Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)
(quoting above langufige from Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients);
United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J. 1991) (stating that the
borough could not justify otherwise discriminatory acts taken towards a group home by
claiming that it was merely responding to community sentiments).
38. See Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, 808 F. Supp. at 134; Borough of
Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 361-62; Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients,
740 F. Supp. at 104-05; see also Stewart B. McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1211 (describ-
ing the community's organizing actions against a group home as evidence of animus to
which the town officials responded).
As stated in Borough of Audubon, "[d]iscriminatory intent may be established where
animus towards a protected group is a significant factor in the community opposition to
which the [local government is] responding." Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. at 361.
39. Stewart B. McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1210-11; Association of Relatives &
Friends of AIDS Patients, 740 F. Supp. at 104 (stating that it is irrelevant whether the
decision maker had any personal bias when the decision maker's motive was to appease
private parties' discriminatory views).
40. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977); Stewart B. McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1211; Baxter v. City of Belle-
ville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Ill. 1989).
41. See, e.g., United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560, 564 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); see also Stewart B. McKinney Found, 790 F. Supp. at 1212
(stating that a decision maker cannot be held accountable for expressions of prejudice by
the community she serves unless circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the decision
maker took such prejudice into account); Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Pa-
tients, 740 F. Supp. at 104 (same). At issue is whether the local government "bowed to the
political pressure" of private citizens during its decision-making process. Stewart B. Mc-
Kinney Found, 790 F. Supp. at 1212; see also United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d




mal procedures and substantive criteria when making its decision.42
Through the application of the Arlington Heights factors,4 3 coupled with
a strong showing of community animus, courts have determined that local
officials were aware of the discriminatory nature of the community oppo-
sition and acted, even partly, to satisfy the community's demands.'
Through the application of the Huntington Branch test,45 courts will
find a discriminatory, disparate impact from otherwise facially neutral
policies or practices' that may be employed by local governments to de-
ter or restrict persons with disabilities from residing in their towns or
neighborhoods.47 Upon a finding of discriminatory impact, courts en-
42. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68. Under the Arlington Heights test, the
courts consider the following factors in determining whether an invidious discriminatory
purpose pervaded the decisions and actions taken by local officials: (1) discriminatory im-
pact; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the sequence of events leading up to
the challenged decision; (4) departures from normal procedural sequences; and (5) depar-
tures from normal substantive criteria. ld.; see also City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d at 564
(listing the above factors); Stewart B. McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1211 (same).
43. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
44. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d at 560. The Sixth Circuit also stated that the plaintiff
need only show that the local government's desire to appease the community was a moti-
vating factor in its decision making. Id.; see also United States v. Borough of Audubon,
797 F. Supp. 353, 361 n.6 (D.N.J. 1991).
45. The first prong of the test is the strength of the plaintiff's showing of discrimina-
tory effect. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). The second prong, called the least important prong, is whether
there is some evidence of discriminatory intent. See Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d
at 935-36 (holding that plaintiffs need not show any evidence of discriminatory intent to
establish a prima facie case under disparate impact analysis); Association of Relatives &
Friends of AIDS Patients, 740 F. Supp. at 106; Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720,
732 (S.D. Ill. 1989). The third prong is an inquiry into the defendant's professed interest in
taking the disputed action. See Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients, 740 F.
Supp. at 107 (finding that the defendant is required to prove that its action furthers, "'in
theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alterna-
tive would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect'" (quoting Huntington
Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 936)). The final prong considers "whether the plaintiff seeks
to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of a protected class
or merely seeks to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property owners
wishing to provide such housing." l at 106 (citing Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978)).
46. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 934; Support Ministries for Per-
sons with AIDS, Inc., v. Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Oxford House
v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,461 (D.N.J. 1992); Association of Relatives &
Friends of AIDS Patients, 740 F. Supp. at 105.
47. Such requirements are justified as a legitimate exercise of a local government's
power to protect safety and health. See, e.g., Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1218 (D. Conn. 1992) (explaining that
local governments impose or enforce the health, safety or land-use requirements for group
living arrangements for the disabled on supposedly nondiscriminatory grounds); see also
Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS, 808 F. Supp. at 120 (holding residents were
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force the FHA's reasonable accommodation requirement by ordering
modifications or exceptions to zoning practices in order to permit persons
with disabilities to obtain housing.'
Baxter v. City of Belleville49 set the precedent for the uniform adoption
of the Arlington Heights test to prove intentional discrimination towards
disabled persons.50 In Baxter, the plaintiff, seeking to establish a group
home, successfully challenged the denial of a special use permit by argu-
ing that an irrational fear of AIDS precipitated the denial."' The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois found that the
city's actions were "both intentional and specifically designed to prevent
persons with HIV from residing" in the home leased by the plaintiff.52
The Baxter court also set precedent by finding that the denial of the per-
mit resulted in an impermissible disparate impact under the Huntington
Branch test."3 A succession of federal cases that followed Baxter provide
a strong body of law upon which to build a case against local officials who
interfere with the provision of housing for persons with disabilities.54
disabled and that defendants violated the FHA by defining "boarding house" in such a way
as to prevent the establishment of the facility); Oxford House, 799 F. Supp. at 450 (holding
that prospective residents established likelihood of success in proving a FHA violation
based on a disparate impact theory and thus were entitled to an injunction); Association of
Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients, 740 F. Supp. at 95 (holding that denial of special use
permit violated the FHA under the discriminatory intent test and disparate impact test).
48. See, e.g., Stewart B. McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1222 (issuing a preliminary
injunction enjoining the town from requiring a special exception to the plaintiff's use of the
property as a group home and from taking any zoning enforcement action for failure.,to
obtain a special exception); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 879
(W.D. Wisc. 1991) (holding that failure to grant an exception for a group home was a
failure to make reasonable accommodation and, thus, a discriminatory act under the
FHA).
49. 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989).
50. Richard B. Simring, Note, The Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws on
Housing for People with Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 413, 443-44 (1991).
51. Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 732.
52. Id at 732. Both the zoning commission and the city council justified the denial of
the permit after public hearings by stating that the home would diminish property values in
the neighborhood, the site selected was too close to a junior high school, and that many of
the residents would be intravenous drug users. Id. at 723-24. None of these rationales
were supported by any medical evidence of a risk to the neighborhood. Id
53. Id at 732-34. The court found that: (1) the denial of the permit resulted in the
denial of housing, thereby adversely affecting a protected class under the FHA; (2) though
the least important consideration under this test, the court determined that fear of AIDS
was a compelling and motivating factor; (3) that the City's concerns for land use and public
safety were merely pretextual; and (4) that the plaintiff was only seeking permission to use
available housing, not to compel the City to build housing. Id
54. See supra note 32 (citing significant FHA disability cases). The most prominent
cases deal with disabilities such as AIDS and HIV, mental illness, and substance addition,
all of which continue to find the least sympathy from society.
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In Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp.
1197 (D. Conn. 1992), the plaintiff challenged a local zoning commission's determination
that a special exception from the zoning code was required for the establishment of a resi-
dence for persons with AIDS who were homeless or at risk of becoming homeless. Id. at
1200-03. The special use permit was laden with certain requirements and conditions sub-
ject to the significant discretion of the zoning commission. Id. at 1219-20. The United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the zoning commission's
requirement of a special use permit had a discriminatory impact on persons with AIDS.
Id. at 1219. This requirement placed future tenants under public scrutiny in such a manner
that unrelated, nondisabled infected persons would not be placed. Id. The court stated
that the imposed burdens perpetuated the segregation of persons with AIDS. Id. at 1220.
The Court also held that the zoning commission failed to provide a legitimate justification
for its decision to require a special exception. Id at 1221.
In Easter Seals Society v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1992), the
district court granted a preliminary injunction to an organization seeking a construction
permit to build a community residence for persons diagnosed primarily with a psychiatric
disorder and, secondarily, with substance abuse, referred to as Mentally Ill Chemical Abus-
ers (MICA). Id at 230. The record was replete with evidence of community animus to-
wards the MICA residents. Id. In addition, the township required that the plaintiff send
notices of appeal to all property owners in the vicinity of the proposed site even though
such notice was not required for an appeals hearing regarding construction permits. Id at
231-32. Upon advice of counsel, the zoning board deferred the appeal as long as possible
so that the Board of Commissioners could amend the zoning ordinance to require commu-
nity residences such as the proposed facility to acquire a conditional permit laden with
significant and costly conditions. Id at 232. Deviations from normal procedural and sub-
stantive sequences, as well as the evidence of community animus and the local officials'
reassuring comments at public meetings added up to discriminatory intent. Id at 234-35.
In United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991), town officials,
through excessive enforcement of local zoning ordinances, harassed the renter of a home
where recovering alcoholics and drug addicts resided. Id at 360-61. After the borough's
zoning enforcement officer made repeated visits to the group home, he issued weekly cita-
tions for ordinance violations regarding parking, noise, occupancy permits, and zoning. Id.
at 356-57. Finally, the borough served a Notice of Violation and Order to Terminate to the
group home. Id. at 357. While the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey found that zealous enforcement alone did not constitute discrimination, a discrimi-
natory motive became clear in the light of the borough's previous enforcement practices.
Id at 360. Whereas the borough historically had not enforced its code, all branches of the
borough government conspired to enforce the code against the renter. Id. at 361. In addi-
tion, certain comments made by the Mayor and other borough officials at public meetings
that irate citizens attended, revealed that the borough had mobilized to deter the continu-
ing occupation of the home even though none of the speakers made explicit reference to
the residents' disabilities. Id at 360. The court found that the historical background of the
acts and the deviations from normal procedures revealed that an animus against the house
residents on the basis of their disabilities motivated the local government. Id. at 360-61.
The court found a discriminatory animus regardless of whether the local officials shared
the community's animus or were merely acting in response to the community's animus. Id.
The court enjoined the local government from interfering with the house's operation or
any other similar living arrangement for persons with disabilities that may arise in the
future. Id at 363.
Similarly, in Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J.
1992), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey also found a discrimi-
natory impact upon disabled persons, which resulted from the township's interpretation of
"family" in its zoning ordinance. Id at 461. The township imposed more stringent require-
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B. Section 504: Prohibiting Discrimination in Federally Funded
Programs
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that no individ-
ual with a disability, 5 who is otherwise qualified, shall, solely on the basis
of disability, be excluded from or denied the benefits of any program or
activity receiving federal assistance nor be subjected to discrimination by
such program or activity. 6 With the passage of section 504, Congress
ments upon unrelated persons sharing the same dwelling than persons related by blood or
marriage sharing a dwelling. Id. Yet, the court stated:
Because people who are handicapped by alcoholism or drug abuse are more
likely to need a living arrangement such as the one Oxford House provides, in
which groups of unrelated individuals reside together in residential neighbor-
hoods for mutual support during the recovery process, Cherry Hill's application
of this ordinance has a disparate impact on such handicapped people.
Id at 461 (footnote omitted).
The court rejected the township's justification of its requirements on the ground that the
residents of the group home lacked the "permanency and stability" necessary to qualify as
a family unit. Id. at 462. Yet, even if the zoning commission articulated a legitimate justifi-
cation, the court stated that the zoning commission would have to waive the requirement
in order to comply with the FHA's reasonable accommodation requirement. Id
This body of case law is not limited to particular federal districts; such FHA claims have
been successful in federal courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See United States v. Southern Man-
agement Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 923 (4th Cir. 1992); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Mont-
gomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993); Support Ministries for Persons with
AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Horizon House
Developmental Serv., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683,685 (E.D.
Pa. 1992), aff'd without op., 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Oxford House, 799 F. Supp. at 450;
Easter Seals Society, 798 F. Supp. at 238; Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 363; Stewart
B. McKinney Found, Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 1197; United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F.
Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 221
(D.P.R. 1991); Association of Relatives & Friends of Aids Patients v. Regulations & Per-
mits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 107 (D.P.R. 1990); Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 734-35.
55. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the term "individ-
ual with a disability" rather than the term "individual with a handicap" as employed in
section 504).
56. Specifically, section 504 states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
bility in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
Note also that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations define
"federal financial assistance" as "any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement con-
tract or a contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the De-
partment provides or otherwise makes available." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1993).
HHS regulations issued pursuant to section 504 define "recipient" as:
any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or its political
subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or other entity,
or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient,
but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
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intended to ensure that persons with disabilities are provided equal op-
portunity5 7 and are not segregated through any service or program pro-
vided by a recipient of federal assistance.5" The regulations promulgated
under section 504 provide more specific prohibitions.59 For example, sec-
tion 504 proscribes siting determinations, program criteria and adminis-
trative procedures that tend to either screen out disabled persons or
defeat or substantially impair the objectives of the program or service.'
Finally, the regulations provide a broad prohibition against interference
with any disabled person's ability to enjoy "any right, privilege, advan-
tage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving an aid, benefit, or
service.""
1. Limited Applicability to Disabilities Giving Rise to Public Services
In Alexander v. Choate,62 the Supreme Court stated that Congress
clearly sought to rectify both intentional discrimination and discrimina-
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act:
The Move to Integration, 64 TEMp. L. REv. 393, 398 (1991) (stating that Congress, fully
informed of the historical practices of discrimination against and segregation of the dis-
abled, "adopted, as the ADA's statutory purpose, the provision of a 'clear' mandate to end
all forms of segregation and discrimination").
58. See supra note 57.
'59. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (1993). Regulations issued under section 504 by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, now known as "Health and Human Services" or
"HHS," while applicable only to HHS funded programs, were intended to serve as a proto-
type for all other sets of regulations issued by other federal agencies. W.A. Harrington,
Annotation, Construction and Effect of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS
§ 794) Prohibiting Discrimination Against Otherwise Qualified Handicapped Individuals in
Specified Programs or Activities, 44 A.L.R. FED. 148, 152 n.2 (1979).
For example, the regulations prohibit denying the opportunity to participate or provid-
ing an opportunity that is not equal to that provided to others. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(i),
(ii). The regulations make clear that for benefits and services to be considered equally
effective, they are not required to produce identical results or levels of achievement for
disabled and non-disabled persons. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2). They must merely provide such
persons with an equal opportunity to obtain the same result or gain the same benefit in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs. 1d.; see also Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985) (stating that the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was to
ensure equal opportunity to participate and provide even-handed treatment, but not to
guarantee equal results). Other prohibitions include providing an aid, benefit or service
that is not as effective as those provided to others or providing different or separate aids,
benefits, or services unless necessary to make them as effective as those provided to others.
45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(iii), (iv).
60. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4), (5).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(vii).
62. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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tion that results from apathy and benign neglect.6" Therefore, challenges
may be brought to intentionally discriminatory actions or policies as well
as facially neutral actions or policies that have a disparate impact on an
otherwise qualified person. 6'
Treatment of intentional discrimination against disabled persons differs
from other types of discrimination, such as race discrimination, in that an
individual's disability may be taken into account when determining the
individual's eligibility for a particular public program or service.65 As
stated in Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,66 a court can pre-
sume that an adverse action was based solely on the disability if the de-
fendant articulates factors that are established as causally related to the
disability, and if it is shown that the defendant was aware of the disability
at the time of the alleged discrimination.67 Upon such a showing, the
defendant must rebut an inference of impermissible discrimination by
63. Id. at 295. The Court noted that statements made in the Congressional Record
"would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from
action that discriminated by effect as well as by design." Id. at 297 (footnote omitted).
64. Id at 296-97.
65. Id. at 298; Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir.
1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992).
66. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 514; see also Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1108 (2d Cir. 1992). For
example, in Teahan, an employer fired an individual with alcoholism for absenteeism. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff
had not met his burden of showing that the employer had used absenteeism as a pretext for
firing him. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514. As a result, the trial court held that the employer had
not fired the plaintiff solely on the basis of his disability. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff
argued that his absenteeism was conduct that manifested from his disability, and therefore
his employer's adverse action against him was based solely on the disability. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that when an em-
ployer admits that it based its actions on conduct manifesting from the disability, the em-
ployer has directed such action solely at the disability as long as the employer knew of the
disability at the time of the adverse action. Id. at 515.
If factors causally unrelated to the disability justify an adverse action taken against a
person with a disability, the plaintiff must then show that such explanation is pretextual.
Id. at 514; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(explaining that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that defendant's
reason is merely pretext for a discriminatory reason).
To show a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 504, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the program or service receives federal assistance; (2) he or she is disabled, as
defined in Section 504; (3) that the action or decision was made solely on the basis of the
disability; and (4) he or she was otherwise qualified for the assistance. Teahan, 951 F.2d at
514; see Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1107 (2d Cir. 1992); Doe v. New York Univ., 666
F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981); Assa'ad-Faltas v. Virginia, 738 F. Supp. 982, 987 (E.D. Va.),
aff'd, 902 F.2d 1564 (4th Cir. 1990).
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demonstrating that such factors were relevant to the essential eligibility
requirements."
Cushing v. Moore69 exemplifies the proper analysis of a potential viola-
tion in the provision of public services. It also demonstrates that section
504 challenges cannot be sustained when the challenge is against adminis-
trative policies that directly relate to the provision of services where the
disability itself, "gives rise to the need of services in question. '70  In
Cushing, the plaintiffs alleged that a methadone clinic's newly-instituted
policy precluding unemployed persons from continued participation in its
"take-home" methadone program was discriminatory.7' The plaintiffs ar-
gued that because their drug addiction precluded their employment, their
termination was based solely on their disability.'2 The district court
found that the plaintiffs' admission that their employment status termi-
nated their privileges was fatal to their claim73 because the determination
was based on characteristics other than their disability.74 On appeal, the
Second Circuit stated that the district court ended its inquiry prematurely
and should have applied the analysis set forth in Teahan.75
The Second Circuit explained that while the plaintiffs' employment sta-
tus was causally related to their drug addiction, the drug addiction itself
was the very factor giving rise to the service offered.76 The court contin-
ued by stating that "section 504 prohibits discrimination against a [dis-
68. The inquiry is whether the defendant properly determined that the disability pre-
cluded the individual from meeting the eligibility criteria of the service or program. See
Teahan, 952 F.2d at 515, 520. This inquiry examines whether the disability or conduct
flowing from the disability is relevant to the essential eligibility requirements. Id.
69. 783 F. Supp. 727 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 970 F.2d 1103 (2d
Cir. 1992).
70. Cushing, 970 F.2d at 1109.
71. Cushing, 783 F. Supp. at 731. Through the "take-home" program, participants ac-
quired "take-home" privileges allowing them to acquire dosages of methadone in amounts
covering an increasing number of days as they progressed through the program. Id. at 730.
This program eliminated the difficult obstacle of daily travel to the clinic, rewarded the
recovering addict for her progress and ensured continued success in recovery. Id. at 730-
31. The policy change deprived the plaintiffs, who were in the program prior to the change,
of the "take-home" privilege and required them to visit the clinic daily for methadone. Id.
at 730. At various stages of recovery, some plaintiffs were homeless and unemployed,
while others, unemployed at the time the policy went into effect, faced eviction from their
homes. Id at 731. The time required to travel to the clinic and wait for the treatment on a
daily basis precluded their gaining employment. Id Others, due to the disability, were
unable to acquire employment at that stage of their recovery. Id
72. Id
73. Id at 735.
74. Id at 734.
75. Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text (describing the Teahan analysis).
76. Cushing, 970 F.2d at 1108.
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abled] person only where the [disability] is unrelated to, and thus,
improper to consideration of, the services in question."77 Regarding the
program's eligibility requirements, the court held that the clinic's policy
of requiring persons who are unemployed because of their addiction to
undergo "the more intensive treatment of daily visits to the clinic" was
justifiable.7" Assuming that their drug addiction was the sole cause of
their termination, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' argument
that they were otherwise qualified could not be sustained under section
504.79 The court stated, however, that if the plaintiffs could show that a
disability other than drug addiction prevented their employment, they
could prevail under Section 504 since the disability giving rise to their
employment status would be unrelated to the eligibility requirements for
the "take-home" program. 0
2. "Reasonable Accommodation" Defense Narrows Reach of Section
504
One possible barrier to a section 504 claim is that reasonable accom-
modation may not be required even though there is proof of a disparate
impact or intentional discrimination.8' The Supreme Court has estab-
lished a balancing test to determine when reasonable accommodation is
required.'
In Alexander v. Choate,8 3 the Supreme Court held that disparate treat-
ment or impact may not always be actionable in light of two counter-
vailing objectives.' The Court recognized that the statutory scheme
requires reasonable modifications to ensure the protection of statutory
rights and integration of persons with disabilities.8 5 The Court held, nev-
ertheless, that the analysis must balance disabled person's statutory rights
77. Id. at 1109.
78. Id
79. Id at 1108.
80. Id at 1109.
81. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 422 U.S. 397 (1979), where it held that a defendant nursing school's refusal to
admit the plaintiff, a deaf person, did not violate section 504. Id. at 414. The Court rea-
soned that both the close supervision necessary to accommodate the plaintiff and the
waiver of certain course and training requirements would compromise the essential nature
of the nursing program. Id at 409-10. Furthermore, the plaintiff still would not gain
meaningful access to the program because, after modification, it would no longer meet the
nursing program's current educational standards. Id. at 410.
82. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-302 (1985); Davis, 442 U.S. at 409-13.
83. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
84. Id at 299. The two countervailing objectives are "the need to give effect to the
statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable bounds." Id
85. Id at 299-300.
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with the grantee's interest in the integrity of programs or services pro-
vided to the community-at-large.86 Thus, the government must make rea-
sonable modifications only when "meaningful access" to a benefit can be
provided without an undue financial burden on a program or without fun-
damentally altering the essential nature of the program. 7
C. Americans with Disabilities Act: Prohibiting Discrimination in the
Public and Private Sectors
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) has been called
the "bill of rights for the disabled."'  The ADA extends the rights of the
disabled into the areas of public and private employment, public services
and transportation, and private sector accommodations and services.89
The drafters intended the ADA to end the segregation and isolation of
disabled persons and to ensure equal opportunities for them throughout
society.90
86. Id see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 413-14 (holding that the modifications sought by the
plaintiff would compromise the essential nature of the defendant's nursing program); supra
note 81 (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis).
87. Id. The Alexander Court stated that "Section 504 does not require the State to
alter this definition of the benefit being offered;" rather section 504 is intended to ensure
evenhanded treatment, not services or benefits specifically tailored to give equal results.
Id at 303-04. In Alexander, the plaintiffs challenged a proposed fourteen-day limit on
Medicaid coverage of in-patient hospital care on the ground that persons with disabilities
had a greater need for prolonged in-patient care. Id at 290-91, 302. Thus, the plaintiffs
argued that the fourteen-day rule denied them meaningful access to medical care provided
through Medicaid. Id The Court rejected this argument by finding that facially, the four-
teen-day rule did not utilize a criteria that distinguished the disabled from the abled. Id. at
302. The Court reasoned that there is no criteria such as "test[s], judgment[s] or trait[s]
that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or less likely of having." Id.
The Alexander Court found that the services and benefits under the Medicaid program
were equally available to both the disabled and abled, and the same limited duration of
coverage applied to both classes. Id. The Court held that section 504 does not require
modification of the benefit provided "simply to meet the reality that the handicapped have
greater medical needs." Id. at 303. The Court stated that to require the State to modify
the benefits to meet the needs of the disabled would require the State to guarantee medical
care specifically tailored to an individual's particular needs. Id at 303-04.
88. Julie Brandford, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 113, 116-17 (1990). Hopefully, the legislation will remedy some
of section 504's inherent limitations especially because the receipt of federal financial
assistance is not necessary to trigger protection. See Cook, supra note 57, at 415.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12141, 12161, and 12182 (Supp. V 1993).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1993); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 2,
3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,485; S. REp. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1989). The Senate explained:
One of the most debilitating forms of discrimination is segregation imposed by
others ....
Discrimination also includes exclusion, or denial of benefits, services, or other
opportunities that are not as effective and meaningful as those provided to others.
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1. Title II: Public Services or Programs
Title II of the ADA extends the prohibitions of section 504 against dis-
crimination based on disability to cover all services, programs, and activi-
ties provided or made available by state and local governments,
regardless of whether they receive federal financial assistance." Con-
gress intended Title II to ensure not only that disabled persons have ac-
cess to public benefits and services,92 but also to encourage disabled
persons' integration into society.93 In addition, the ADA drafters in-
tended Title II to prevent blatant discrimination against disabled persons
based on stereotypes.94 Finally, the regulations promulgated under Title
II require reasonable accommodation to achieve such objectives.
9 5
Congress intended Title II to be interpreted consistently with section
504 as well as with the Court's holdings in Alexander and Davis. 6 As a
result, the same problems under section 504 regarding the feasibility of
Discrimination also includes harms affecting individuals with a history of disa-
bility, and those regarded by others as having a disability as well as persons asso-
ciated with such individuals that are based on false presumptions, generalizations,
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious
mythologies.
In conclusion, there is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and for the integration of persons with disabillities [sic] into the eco-
nomic and social mainstream of American life. Further, there is a need to pro-
vide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. Finally, there is a need to ensure that the
Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing these standards on behalf of
individuals with disabilities.
S. REP. No. 116, supra, 6-7, 20; see also Cook, supra note 57, at 415, 417-18 (arguing that
Congress recognized the limited effectiveness of section 504 in eliminating discrimination
against and segregation of the disabled, and thus intended to make clear that a more ag-
gressive effort to protect the disabled should occur under the ADA and that the ADA was
not merely a reenactment of prior legislation).
91. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1994); see also 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.102 (1994). Title
II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activ-
ities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (Supp. V 1993). The definition of "public entity" includes "any State or local gov-
ernment" as well as "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumen-
tality of a State . . . or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A), (B).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 90.
93. See supra note 90 (discussing the legislative intent underlying the ADA).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 90, at 7; 28
C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.130.
95. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Section 504 regulations supplied a model for Depart-
ment of Justice regulations that provide specific prohibitions. Id § 35.130.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).
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reasonable accommodation exist under the ADA. 7 Because ADA case
law is in its infancy, uncertainty remains regarding whether courts will
continue to interpret "meaningful access" narrowly and "undue financial
or administrative burden" broadly.98 In light of the ADA's legislative
history, courts should be more aggressive in enforcing the protection this
statute provides.99
2. Title III: Private Sector Accommodations and Services
Title III of the ADA extends the general prohibitions of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act to the private sector.'00 Title III expressly pro-
hibits discrimination against disabled persons with regard to goods and
services provided by any place of public accommodation.'"' Privately op-
erated shelters which provide temporary housing fall under Title III as
places of public accommodation, whereas, the FHA covers facilities such
as group homes which provide residential, long-term housing. 10 2 The
97. See infra notes 174-88, 227-44 and accompanying text (discussing several recent
cases brought under the ADA that exemplify the courts' reluctance to enforce the reason-
able accommodation provision in certain circumstances).
98. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 308-09 (1985); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d
1033, 1041-42 (2d Cir. 1990); Williams v. Secretary of Executive Office of Human Servs.,
609 N.E.2d 447, 452-53 (Mass. 1993); Goebel v. Colorado Dep't of Institutions, 764 P.2d
785, 804 (Colo. 1988).
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent underly-
ing the ADA).
100. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 90, at 58 (explaining the purpose of Title III).
101. Title III prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability "in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or oper-
ates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Supp. V 1993); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.201(a) (1993).
102. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104, 36.130 (1994). The definition of "public accommodation" in-
cludes shelters and day centers, either as social service center establishments or as places of
lodging. ld.; U.S. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrY COMM. & THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, AMERICANS wrr DISAILffIEs Acr HANDBOOK, 111-29 to 111-30 (1992) [hereinafter
ADA HANDBOOK]. "The category of social service center establishments would include
not only the types of establishments listed, day care centers ... homeless shelters, food
banks ... but also establishments such as substance abuse treatment centers ... and half-
way houses." ADA HANDBOOK, supra, at 111-28.
The Department of Justice's analysis of Title III's coverage of lodging clarifies the rela-
tion between the FHA and Title III with regard to residential facilities and residential
hotels that also may include facilities offered as homeless shelters. Id at 111-29 to 111-30.
The factors that distinguish facilities covered by the FHA from those covered by Title III
are the length of stay and the provision of social services. Id If a shelter provides only
long-term residential stays, such facility is not a "place of lodging," and, thus is not a "place
of public accommodation" under Title III. Id Only the FHA covers such residential facil-
ities. Id Yet, if the same facility also offers social services, then the facility is likewise
subject to Title III as a "social service center establishment," which is a "place of accom-
modation" regardless of length of stay. Id
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ADA drafters intended Title III to end the private sector's discrimination
against and segregation of disabled individuals that results from the re-
fusal by places of public accommodation to accommodate or provide
services to such individuals.'013 Congress primarily sought to ensure that
disabled persons have access to and the opportunity to participate in "the
economic and social mainstream of American life."'1 4
The specific prohibitions found in Title III regulations mirror those
found in both section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the
ADA. 10 5 In general, a place of public accommodation may not deny par-
ticipation or opportunity, provide less equal services or accommodations,
including segregated services or accommodations unless necessary, or
utilize administrative criteria or methods that tend to screen out disabled
persons."° Title III regulations also prohibit retaliatory actions directed
On the other hand, if a facility offers only short term stays, it is a "place of lodging," and
thus, also subject to Title III. Id. Facilities such as "single room occupancy hotels," which
provide housing on a short-term basis, are considered "places of lodging" under Title III.
Id at 111-30. If the short-term stay facility also offers social services, the facility falls under
Title III as both a "place of lodging" and a "social service center establishment." Id Title
III regulations and the Department of Justice's administrative analysis, however, do not
clearly establish what the terms of distinction are for short and long stays. Id.
103. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 90, at 6-7, 10.
104. Id at 58. In effect, Title III joins previous legislation that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, gender, national origin or religion by including disability as a
protected class. See ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 111-3, 111-41. Relying upon its
Commerce Clause powers, Congress ensured that Title III reaches nearly all places of pub-
lic accommodation with a few express exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1), (7); see also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (regarding Congress' broad Commerce Clause powers to ad-
dress discrimination in public accommodations and services offered by the private sector).
The regulations under Title III define a "place of public accommodation" as a "facility,
operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one
of [twelve specified] categories." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Such categories are expressly listed
in the Americans with Disabilities Act and are
(1) [p]laces of lodging[,] (2) [e]stablishments serving food or drink[,] (3) [p]laces
of exhibition or entertainment[,] (4) [p]laces of public gathering[,] (5) [s]ales or
rental establishments[,] (6) [s]ervice establishments[,] (7) [sltations used for speci-
fied public transportation[,] (8) [p]laces of public display or collection[,] (9)
[p]laces of recreation[,] (10) [p]laces of education[,] (11) [s]ocial service center
establishments [and] (12) [p]laces of exercise or recreation.
ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 1-27; see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The regulations
provide examples of each category, yet such examples are not intended to be exhaustive.
ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 111-27. In effect, the Title III prohibitions extend to
all places of public accommodation with a few notable exceptions such as private clubs,
religious entities, and rooming houses occupied by the proprietor and with not more than
five rooms for rent. 28 C.F.R. § 36.102; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(5).
105. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.201, .204, .206; S. REp. No. 116, supra note 90, at 58.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(2); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.201 to 36.204; see also S. REP. No. 116,
supra note 90, at 60 (discussing the purposes of the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions
that are imposed on places of public accommodations).
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at any individual, with or without a disability, who expresses opposition
to unlawful practices or who aids or encourages another to exercise her
rights under the ADA. 107 Furthermore, the ADA prohibits coercive or
intimidating acts that are intended to interfere with an individual's exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right under the Act.l"a
D. Mental Illness, Alcoholism, and Drug Addiction as Recognized
Disabilities
Although federal disabilities laws generally require an individualized
inquiry as to whether a plaintiff is an "individual with a disability,"' 9
these laws protect the most vulnerable of the homeless population as a
class."' The definition of physical or mental impairment specifically in-
cludes emotional or mental illness, alcoholism, and drug addiction."'
107. 28 C.F.R. § 36.206.
108. Id.
109. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-86 (1987). But see
United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that a premature ruling did not short circuit the individualized inquiry).
110. Under section 504 regulations, a "qualified individual with a disability" means a
"[disabled] person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such
services." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4). The definition of "individual with a disability" under
Title I of the ADA is similar to that in section 504, and Congress intended that its inter-
pretation be consistent with regulations issued under section 504. H.R. REP. No. 711,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183. Accordingly,
the courts have relied on section 504 interpretations of the term. See Southern Manage-
ment, 955 F.2d at 918; United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.N.J.
1991). Due to confusion under the section 504 definition regarding the relationship be-
tween accommodation and eligibility, Title I's regulations define a "qualified individual
with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifi-
cations ... meets the essential eligibility requirements." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (emphasis ad-
ded). Qualifying the definition serves two functions. First, it ensures that the definition of
an individual with a disability does not exclude a person whose disability may be mitigated
by auxiliary aids or services. 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.104. Second, it ensures that a
disabled person is not precluded from meeting eligibility requirements because of a lack of
auxiliary aids or services or due to a failure to make reasonable modifications to rules or
policies. Id. The definition of an individual with a disability under the FHA and Title III
of the ADA is not qualified by an "eligibility requirement" as found under section 504 and
Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Supp. V 1993).
111. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (1994) (defining physical or mental impairment under
the F-A); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994) (defining physical or mental impairment under the
ADA); 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.103(1)(ii), 41.31(b)(1) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1992).
Although section 504 does not explicitly include alcoholism or drug addiction as disabili-
ties, courts have consistently recognized alcoholism and drug addiction as disabilities under
the Rehabilitation Act. See Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989); Crewe
v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987); Sullivan v. City
of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); Oxford House,
Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N.J. 1992); United States v. Bor-
ough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that courts have uniformly
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The definition of an "individual with a disability," however, explicitly ex-
cludes an individual currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs and,
thus, permits discrimination on such basis." 2
1. Three Tests May Be Applied to Determine Coverage
The regulations promulgated under section 504, the FHA, and the
ADA explicitly provide three different tests that may deem a person "an
individual with a disability. '"' 13 Under the definition of disability, a per-
son is disabled if he or she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" 4 of such indi-
vidual; (2) has a record of having such an impairment; (3) or is regarded
as having such an impairment." 5
Under the first test, a physical or mental impairment substantially lim-
its one or more of a person's major life activities if such activities are
"restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they
can be performed in comparison to most people.""' 6 Therefore, this test
would protect homeless individuals whose emotional or mental illness or
alcoholism substantially limits their ability to work or care for them-
selves. 1 7 Under certain circumstances, this test would also protect home-
less individuals who suffer from a drug addiction that substantially limits
a major life activity.
118
The second test-"a record of such impairment"-intends to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of a past impairment." 9 This test protects
persons who have a record of an impairment from which they have recov-
found that persons suffering from alcoholism and recovering from substance abuse are
disabled under section 504); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (Supp. V 1993); 28 C.F.R.
99 35.104, 35.131(a)(1) (1994).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104; 45 C.F.R. § 84.30).
114. Section 504 and ADA regulations provide that "[t]he phrase major life activities
means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35 (providing interpretative guidance
and examples for the phrases "substantially limits" and "major life activities").
115. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(1) (1993); see also 28 C.F.R. app. A
to pt. 35, § 35.104 (describing the three tests).
116. 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.104 (describing Test A for meeting the definition of
"disability").
117. ADA HAmnDOOK, supra note 102, at 11-20, 111-20.
118. Id. at 11-47, 111-61; 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.131, 36.209.




ered, 120 such as persons with a history of emotional or mental illness.'
2 '
Furthermore, it also protects recovering alcoholics and drug addicts. 22
The third test, "being regarded as having such an impairment," protects
individuals who are treated as if they have "an impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity, regardless of whether [such persons
have] an impairment.' 23 The key element of the third test is the defend-
ant's perception of the individual. 24 This test is applicable particularly to
the stereotypic views and stigmatizing perceptions of the homeless as
dangerous, unstable addicts, which results in discrimination against dis-
abled persons who happen to be homeless.' 25 In addition, this test also
covers homeless persons who are not disabled but who are treated ad-
versely as a result of stigmatizing perceptions held by others of disabilities
most common among the homeless.'
26
The Fourth Circuit employed this third test to bypass analysis under the
first test of whether unidentified, prospective tenants of an apartment
complex were, in fact, impaired individuals. 127 In United States v. South-
ern Management Corp., 2 the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline129 to find
that an individualized inquiry as to whether prospective tenants had an
actual impairment was unnecessary because the prospective tenants met
the definition of disabled as a result of the defendant's perception that
they had such an impairment. 3 ° This perception, therefore, limited the
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 45 C.F.R. § 84.30).
122. 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.104 (discussing Test B for meeting the definition of
"disability").
123. Id. (setting out the third test, Test C, for meeting the definition of "disability").
124. Id.
125. Id. The Department of Justice stated in its preamble to the final regulations
promulgated under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
a person who is denied services or benefits by a public entity because of myths,
fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under this
third test whether or not the person's physical or mental condition would be con-
sidered a disability under the first or second test in the definition.
Id.
126. Id
127. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir.
1992) (affirming a lower court ruling based on an analysis that "short-circuited" the indi-
vidualized inquiry).
128. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
129. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In Arline, the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant's
discriminatory perception of an individual can substantially limit certain life activities of
that individual. Id at 284.
130. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d at 918-19.
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prospective tenants' participation in the major life activity of obtaining
housing. 1
31
Other courts prefer a more conservative approach than the Fourth Cir-
cuit's bootstrap analysis.'32 Even this more orthodox approach, however,
minimizes the need for an individualized inquiry.133 In Oxford House v.
Township of Cherry Hill,"3 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey held that alcoholism and drug addiction are impair-
ments, but it refused to employ the bootstrap approach with regard to
whether such impairments substantially limited a major life activity.' 35
Instead, the court, relying on a factual showing of the limitations that
recovering alcoholics and substance abusers faced, found that such im-
pairments substantially limited major life activities and, thus, held that
the plaintiffs were "individuals with disabilities.'
1 36
2. Limited Protection for Current Illegal Drug Use
Although the federal disabilities laws recognize drug addiction as a dis-
ability, they only fully protect those individuals who suffer from drug ad-
diction but who are not currently using drugs illegally. 37 Individuals
currently using drugs illegally receive limited protection. 38
131. Id. at 919.
132. See, e.g., Oxford House v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459-60 &
n.21 (D.N.J. 1992) (declining to follow cases that interpret "disabled" in such a broad
manner).
133. See id.
134. 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992).
135. Id at 459-60.
136. Id. at 460. The court stated that
[t]his testimony shows that alcoholism and drug addiction place severe limitations
on people's lives, including disrupting personal relationships and impairing one's
ability to advance in education or employment, and that such limitations do not
magically disappear at the moment that abstinence begins, but rather continue to
effect a person's functioning at least through the early stages of recovery.
Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988) (excluding "current illegal use of or addiction to a con-
trolled substance" from the definition of disability under the FHA); 42 U.S.C. § 12115
(Supp. V 1993) (amending section 7(8) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.131 (1994). "Illegal use of drugs means the use of one or
more drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (28 U.S.C. § 812) ... [and] does not include the use of a drug taken under
[medical] supervision . .. ." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). "Current illegal use" is defined as
the "illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a
person's drug use is... a real and ongoing problem." Id. § 35.104; see also 28 C.F.R. app.
A to pt. 35, § 35.131 (1994); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 573.
138. The FHA has a slight variation to the current drug addiction exclusion where the
definition of disability excludes "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled sub-
stance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The language of the statute creates some uncertainty regard-
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To enjoy the protection afforded under the disability laws, the regula-
tions specifically require that the individual show either successful com-
pletion of a supervised drug rehabilitation program, otherwise successful
rehabilitation, or participation in a supervised rehabilitation program. 13 9
In addition, the laws protect a person who is erroneously regarded as
using drugs illegally."4
Section 504 and the ADA allow public and private entities to discrimi-
nate on the basis of current illegal drug use.' 4 ' The exception to this
permissible discrimination under section 504 and the ADA states that a
public or private entity may not deny health or drug rehabilitation serv-
ices to an individual on the basis of that individual's current illegal drug
use if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services. 42 Neverthe-
less, the regulations entitle a drug rehabilitation or treatment program to
terminate the participation of individuals who engage in illegal drug use
while in the program.1
43
ing whether a person addicted to illegal drugs, but no longer engaging in illegal drug use,
could be excluded from the FHA's protection. See United States v. Southern Management
Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920-22 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the FHA's language did not per-
mit discrimination against those currently addicted, but allows discrimination against those
who are in the early stages of recovery, based on the medical understanding that addiction
is a chronic illness that is recoverable, but not curable). The legislative history reveals that
Congress did not intend to withhold protection for recovering substance abusers. H.R.
REP. No. 711, supra note 110, at 22. To ensure that the FHA did not protect illegal drug
use, the House report, in reference to amendments made to the FHA in 1988, stated:
[I]ndividuals who have a record of drug use or addiction but who do not currently
use illegal drugs would continue to be protected if they fell under the definition of
handicap. The Committee does not intend to exclude individuals who have re-
covered from an addition [sic] or are participating in a treatment program or a
self-help group .... Just like any other person with a disability, such as cancer or
tuberculosis, former drug-dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or
its inhabitants simply on the basis of status. Depriving such individuals of hous-
ing, or evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously
jeopardize their continued recovery.
Id Any further confusion due to the language of the 1988 amendments to the FHA has
been resolved by the ADA, which set out clearer guidelines. See Southern Management,
955 F.2d at 922.
139. 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(a)(2).
140. Id. § 35.131(a)(2)(iii).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(a).
142. 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(b).
143. Id § 35.131(b)(2); see also 28 C.F.R. app. A to pt. 35, § 35.131.
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II. FAIR HOUSING ACT AND SECTION 504 PROVIDE LIMITED
PROTECrION TO HOMELESS DISABLED PERSONS WITH
REGARD TO AccEss
A. Fair Housing Act: Barriers Posed by Statutory Language and
Judicial Interpretation of Access
In the context of group homes, the FHA has successfully challenged
discriminatory local governmental actions taken against disabled persons
in response to community opposition.'" Despite such success, the statu-
tory interpretation of "dwelling" as well as the class of persons that the
FHA intends to protect hinder attempts to protect disabled persons who
utilize shelters and day centers. 45 The significant difficulty in proving
discrimination on the basis of disability presents an additional obstacle."4
Finally, courts have focused on political and budgetary concerns in evalu-
ating whether claims are justiciable.' 47
1. Statutory Language Creates Significant Barriers
A suit challenging animus directed at shelters or day centers and their
occupants can be easily dismissed as not falling under the FHA, thus a
limited number of cases have been brought under the FHA.1' The Dis-
144. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the strong body of case law
that has developed under the FHA in the context of discrimination against group homes).
Successful claims also have been brought under the Equal Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, a local government denied the condi-
tional use permit applications of an organization that operated facilities providing shelter
and treatment programs for homeless alcoholics. Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 617 F.
Supp. 1488, 1490 (W.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987). The district court held that this denial violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protec-
tion because the decision was not rationally related to any legitimate government interest.
Id. at 1499; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50
(1985).
145. Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991) (expressing grave doubt that the
FHA applies to shelters and that shelter residents fall under the class intended to be
protected).
146. See infra notes 154-73 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of proving
discrimination against the homeless disabled).
147. Johnson, 786 F. Supp. at 1. Residents of a homeless shelter filed suit on a number
of counts including FHA violations and constitutional violations to enjoin the shelter's
closure. Id. The court cast the issue under the political question doctrine and denied the
motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 6-7. The court stated that the "District of Co-
lumbia is... a governmental body acting within the ambit of legitimately derived author-
ity, both fiscal and legislative, and the relief sought is not merely a waiver of a regulatory
requirement, but, rather, a 'massive judicial intrusion' upon that governmental autonomy."
Id at 7.
148. See Johnson, 786 F. Supp. at 4 n.8. Most challenges to the use of local zoning
ordinances to prevent or control the siting of shelters are brought to the local level through
local appeal of zoning board decisions. Then, the cases generally advance to the state or
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trict Court for the District of Columbia exemplifies the chilling effect of
the narrow interpretation of "dwelling."
In Johnson v. Dixon,14 9 the court stated that the plaintiffs' reliance on
the FHA to challenge the closure of two shelters was a "questionable"
application of the statute, and that it was "doubtful" that the shelters
could be deemed a "'dwelling' within the meaning of the Act, even if it
may seem like home" to the plaintiffs.' 50 The court, in finding that a
preliminary injunction was unwarranted, stressed that the closures were a
political decision best left to the district government. 15'
The second problem that the FHA's statutory language poses concerns
standing. The Johnson court noted that because the FHA primarily pro-
tects only "buyers" and "renters," the FHA did not cover disabled per-
sons who use shelters since they are neither renters or buyers.' 52 Courts
also appear unwilling to view the homeless disabled as "residents" of
shelters or day centers. 53
federal courts after an unsuccessful appeal. See, e.g., Easter Seals Soc'y of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 231-33 (D.N.J. 1992) (describing the local
appeal process followed by the plaintiffs when seeking a construction permit). This Com-
ment cannot properly address the detailed and complex local zoning ordinances and zoning
definitions and the local appeals processes. Most challenges, however, focus either on pro-
cedural issues or on the interpretation of a zoning ordinance as it applies to the proposed
use of property. See Franklinton Coalition v. Open Shelter, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1983) (reversing lower court's narrow interpretation of ."hotel," which had justified
an injunction against a permit granted to a shelter operating in a commercial zone); Repko
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 517 A.2d 1028 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that a shelter for
battered women met the broad definition of "rooming house"). Most shelters target the
general homeless population, but also offer services for the disabled homeless. See Collier,
supra note 1. Thus, challenges based on a specific group of shelter users are difficult to
make on the federal level. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text (discussing the
difficulty of proving that community opposition to homeless shelters is rooted in animus
towards disabilities most common among the homeless).
149. 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id. at 6-7.
152. Id at 4.
153. See id. Yet, a private party seeking to provide shelter to disabled persons in the
face of hostile zoning decisions could bring a claim on behalf of disabled persons if the
party could successfully argue that the shelter met the definition of dwelling and could
prove discriminatory intent or impact. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B) (1988). Section 3604(f) of
the Fair Housing Act, as amended, makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or
rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because
of a handicap of... a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so
sold, rented, or made available." Id (emphasis added). A private party who intended to
provide a shelter could also bring a claim against a local government that leased property
to it, assuming the above mentioned difficulties are overcome. Id.
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2. Barrier Posed By Proving Community Animus
Even if the obstacles posed by the FHA's statutory language could be
overcome, a plaintiff must still prove that the government actions that
limited or eliminated the use of the property as a shelter were directed
against disabled users and were not motivated by budgetary concerns or
community animus toward the homeless population in general." 4 Most
shelters that a significant number of homeless disabled use are open to
the general homeless population."' The major distinction between group
homes and shelters is that group homes selectively target potential resi-
dents with specific disabilities, which become known to the commu-
nity.' 56  Thus, community animus is clearly directed toward the
disability.15 7 Yet, community opposition to shelters for the general
homeless population is more difficult to define.'
5 8
Often, such opposition is couched in abstract terms such as concerns
about property value reductions, public safety, or public nuisances.1
5 9
Comments often made about the homeless reflect broad stereotypes,
such as "they" look or smell bad, are destructive, are dangerous, behave
irrationally or make "me" feel uncomfortable, or refuse to be self-suffi-
cient."6 These characterizations are also stereotypes of homeless dis-
154. The greatest hurdle in a successful FHA claim is proving that either (1) the gov-
ernmental action directed at a shelter or day center was motivated in part by community
animus toward the homeless disabled who use or would use the shelter, or (2) that the
action resulted in or would result in a disparate impact on the homeless disabled which
warrants reasonable accommodation. See Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm., 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1211, 1218 (D. Conn. 1992); see also Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68; Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-36 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15
(1988).
155. See BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 74-75.
156. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing examples of community animus
directed at group homes for persons with specific disabilities).
157. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
158. See CHANDLER, supra note 19, at 49; Seicshnaydre, supra note 19, at 1974; infra
note 162 (discussing the difficulty of showing a nexus between community animus toward
the general homeless population and the real or perceived behavior resulting from disabili-
ties left untreated).
159. See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Serv., 712 P.2d
914, 921 (Ariz. 1985) (neighborhood association closed down a church center's meal pro-
gram for the homeless based on public nuisance); accord Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp.
1121, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (state board of visitors for a children's psychiatric hospital at-
tempted unsuccessfully to prevent the development of a homeless shelter for men close to
the hospital on the ground that the institutionalized children had a constitutional guaranty
of safety while in the state's custody).
160. Some of these characterizations may be true. A significant number of homeless
have become fearful of shelters, which have become havens for drug dealers, recently re-
leased convicts or other persons with dubious character. Ryan McCarthy, Ozenick: Board
Lacks "Guts" on Homeless Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 20, 1993, at N1, available in
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abled persons.16' The difficulty of proving discrimination under the FHA
is showing the requisite nexus between these perceptions and the real or
perceived behavior that untreated disabilities cause.162 A plaintiff's fail-
ure to prove that the root of community animus is fear or a misunder-
standing of the most common disabilities among the homeless disabled
will ultimately defeat a FHA claim because it is then impossible to prove
that the local governmental took action to appease that community ani-
mus. 63 Community animus, which may be a product of misunderstand-
ing and stereotypical fear of certain disabilities, is buried in what
superficially appears to be simply class animus."&
Similarly, a disparate impact claim can fail due to an insufficient show-
ing of community animus directed at the homeless disabled. While this
showing is called the "least important" prong of the Huntington Branch
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Sandra Mathers, Homeless Center Also Takes in
Crime, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 8, 1993, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
It is important to consider that community animus may also be rooted in racism. In
these situations, similar difficulties may arise in proving discriminatory intent. An exami-
nation of the availability of federal protection from discrimination on the basis of race for
homeless persons, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
161. See BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 154-55.
162. While a number of studies examine the public's perception of the homeless prob-
lem and its causes, this author could not identify any studies that specifically demonstrate
the nexus between public perception of the homeless, as well as community opposition to
shelters, and animus towards the real or perceived behavior of persons with untreated or
destabilizing disabilities such as mental illness or substance addiction. JON ERICKSON &
CHARLES WILHELM EDS., HOUSING THE HOMELESS (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Ur-
ban Policy Research, 1986) (providing account of current images of homeless and the role
of the media in shaping these images); Beth D. Jarrett & Wes Daniel, Law and the Home-
less: An Annotated Bibliography, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 463 (1993) (providing an extensive bibli-
ography of writings and studies on homelessness). Studies that demonstrate community
reaction to local psychiatric facilities that service low income and homeless mentally ill may
prove helpful. See Judith G. Rabkin, Community Attitudes and Local Psychiatric Facilities,
in THE CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENT: FIVE YEARS LATER, 325,326,328-29 (John A. Talbott
ed., 1984). Rabkin reports that persons with mental illness who were least acceptable to
mainstream society are.
those who are assaultive, of lower social, economic, and educational status, mem-
bers of ethnic minorities, male, with few social or family ties, whose behavior is
visibly disturbed, and who display behavioral rather than physical symptoms.
Id. at 326. For the most part, these characteristics easily describe a certain portion of the
homeless disabled population.
163. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (noting that federal courts rely sig-
nificantly on evidence of community animus to persons with disabilities to infer that the
local government actions were imbued with discriminatory intent).
164. Class discrimination clearly is not actionable under federal law or the Constitution.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding that the poor
are not a suspect class for strict scrutiny).
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analysis, 165 such proof is nonetheless necessary to overcome the appar-
ently legitimate governmental concerns with public safety, the commu-
nity's zoning scheme, property values, and budgetary constraints.
If a plaintiff cannot provide proof of community animus, the adverse
impact that results from the siting or loss of the shelters or day centers
must be clearly demonstrated and sufficient to warrant reasonable ac-
commodation. To convince a court of such disparate impact, two major
presumptions must be overcome. The first presumption is that the home-
less disabled will seek shelter regardless of where it is offered.'" The
second presumption is that there is no nexus between the siting of shel-
ters and the continued stigmatization of the disabled. Siting shelters
away from the mainstream of society, 67 or in poorer neighborhoods, 6 '
perpetuates the regime of isolation and segregation 169 of disabled per-
165. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-36 (2d
Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (holding that plaintiffs need not show evidence of discrimi-
natory intent to establish a prima facie case under disparate impact analysis); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (stating that the evidence of discriminatory intent was the
least important factor in determining whether a discriminatory, disparate impact fell on a
protected class); Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations &
Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 106 (D.P.R. 1990) (applying a disparate impact analysis);
Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (applying a disparate
impact analysis).
166. The common presumption is that if "this" town, city, district or neighborhood,
does not shelter the homeless, then they will move to another one where such services are
provided. The court's assessment of the impact on the homeless disabled resulting from
shelter closures in Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1991), exemplifies this
presumption. See BAUM & BURnES, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that local officials fear
attracting large numbers of homeless from around the country if they provide "better than
average services and shelters" and that the numbers show that more than 70% of the
homeless have lived in the same city for at least one year and over 60% for at least ten
years); McCarthy, supra note 160, at N1 (describing a local community debate regarding
whether to move a temporary homeless shelter and considering it better to keep the shelter
in its present location where most of the homeless are).
In addition, familiarity and routine can be very important to those with severe mental or
emotional disabilities. Rhoden, supra note 15, at 416 n.184; see also Deirdre Carmody, The
Tangled Life and Mind of Judy, Whose Home is the Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1984, at B1
(describing the daily rituals of a homeless woman in New York City). In many instances,
once a homeless person with such disabilities develops familiarity with and a routine within
a particular neighborhood, he or she will remain even if the shelter does not. Id.; Patti
Doten, On the Streets Where They Live, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1989, at 39 (profiling an
author and her studies of the homeless that find the homeless rooted in routine).
167. See Franklin, supra note 8, at 7B; see also, Cook, supra note 57, at 399-414
(describing the historical practice of siting services and institutions for the disabled in loca-
tions isolated from the mainstream to ensure segregation).
168. Don't Site All Homeless Shelters in Poverty Areas, supra note 8, at 60; Home for
the Homeless: A Community Complains of Growing Problems, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 26, 1993, at B-6, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
169. See Cook, supra note 57, at 399-414.
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sons.17° The disabled who are the most vulnerable and least cared for by
the system are those who rely on shelters for both literal shelter and con-
nection to supportive services.' 7' Siting shelters or day centers, however,
in close proximity to supportive services located outside of the shelter or
center is crucial to re-integration.172 At a minimum, proximity to services
is necessary to stabilize disabling illnesses, so some level of self-suffi-
ciency can be attained. 73
3. "Separation of Powers" Barrier
Gaining sympathy from the courts is also a significant hurdle to over-
come. Johnson v. Dixon illustrates the difficulty of using FHA claims to
force the continued operation of local or state funded shelters so as to
avoid the sometimes severe impact upon disabled persons when shelters
close and when the disruption of services occurs. 174
In Johnson, four homeless disabled persons challenged the closing of
two public shelters in the District of Columbia. 75 The plaintiffs alleged
that the District violated the FHA by yielding to community animus to-
ward the mental and physical disabilities of the shelter occupants.' 76 The
170. By hiding the homeless, a significant number of disabled persons are also kept
apart from mainstream America. See BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 74-75 (stating that
society is in denial by hiding the homeless in shelters and ignoring the realities of home-
lessness); supra note 10 (noting the number of disabled persons comprising the homeless
population).
171. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580,584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). In a com-
plaint filed by homeless dischargees of state psychiatric facilities who demanded residential
placement, the court noted that
defendants do in fact provide appropriate residential placement, care and super-
vision to some patients who are discharged ... but that plaintiffs, by virtue of the
greater severity of their illnesses, are refused such treatment and consigned to life
on the New York City streets. Such a paradoxical administration of public chari-
table resources - that the more severely handicapped are allotted, for that rea-
son, less assistance than to others in the same class - has been held violative to
both New York and federal equal protection guarantees.
IcL at 584. The court sustained the plaintiffs' claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Id; see also BAUM & BuRNs, supra note 2, at 74-75, 178 (noting that even shelters
do not offer sufficient rehabilitative services to the mentally ill and substance addicted and
arguing that outreach to this population must occur at shelter sites in order to immediately
connect it to appropriate treatment programs).
172. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 2, at 75 (stating that "[r]esearch shows that homeless
individuals are not very likely to keep referral appointments or to be able to negotiate
often arcane and geographically dispersed social service bureaucracies without considera-
ble assistance").
173. Id at 79-80.
174. Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1991).
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id at 1-2. The two shelters provided overnight shelter and significant ancillary
services such as medical and rehabilitative services, which included a substance abuse pro-
1995]
582 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:551
court, confronted with a request for a preliminary injunction, 177 ex-
amined whether the plaintiffs could succeed under a FHA disparate im-
pact claim.' 7a The court expressed serious doubt as to whether this type
of claim could be brought under the FHA.179 The court stated that the
FHA did not protect the inhabitants of the shelters because they were
neither "renters" nor "buyers."'" ° The court also stated that it was highly
unlikely that a shelter could satisfy the FHA's definition of "dwelling.'
8'1 ,
The court declined to enjoin the closure of the shelters and refused to
order the District to make accommodations." The court did recognize,
however, that the closure of the shelters, without adequate notice or
measures taken to assist the residents in transferring to another shelter,
resulted in a significant disruption of services." 3 This disruption caused a
gram, and connection to other public assistance programs. Id at 2, 5. Private parties
under contract with the District provided such services. Id. at 2. The shelters also pro-
vided residents a mailing address, which is critical for eligibility to and receipt of benefits
and other services. Id. at 5.
177. A preliminary injunction may be granted if the plaintiff satisfies the following fac-
tors: (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) the plaintiff is subject to irrepa-
rable harm while the litigation is pending; (3) the defendant will not suffer substantial harm
as the result of the requested injunctive relief; and (4) the requested relief is in the public
interest. Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
849 (1987); see also Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 457
(D.N.J. 1992) (applying the four factors when considering a preliminary injunction); Easter
Seals Soc'y of New Jersey, Inc. v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 233 (D.N.J.
1992) (applying the four factors when considering a preliminary injunction). A preliminary
injunction is considered an extreme remedy, therefore a thorough inquiry of the merits of
the plaintiff's claim is required. Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning
Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1191, 1207 (D. Conn. 1992).
178. Johnson, 786 F. Supp. at 1-2. The plaintiffs, unable to prove discriminatory intent,
relied on evidence that showed disparate impact in order to try to prove discrimination
under the FHA. Id. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of an order enjoining the
closure of the shelters or some other form of alternative shelter and services to individuals
affected by the closures. Id.
179. Id at 4.
180. Id The court recognized that a substantial number of the persons who inhabited
the shelter and relied on its services were mentally ill, chronically ill and/or substance ad-
dicted and, thus, were disabled. I. at 2-3.
181. Id at 4.
182. Id at 7.
183. The facilities simply were closed and the residents were "left to their own devices
to adjust to the absence of their customary habitations." Id. at 5. The district made no
arrangements to transfer medical and rehabilitation records to other service providers. Id.
The district neither arranged for the disabled to participate in other city programs, nor
informed the staff where to deliver the residents' records. Id. This significantly disrupted
the disabled's use of rehabilitative services, endangering both a disabled participant's pro-
gress and health. Id. The district also failed to provide sufficient notice or means to permit
the residents' mail to be forwarded, and thus significantly cut off public assistance for a
period of time. Id. The district neither provided space for them at other shelters nor did it
schedule transportation to take them to another facility. Id Finally, the district failed to
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severe, detrimental impact on those who relied upon it.", Yet, the court
found that accommodations were already available. 85 The court rea-
soned that the former residents could find openings in other shelters in
the District if they sought them out; transportation could be provided if
the District found it necessary; and continuity of health care, individual
counseling and substance abuse programs could be reestablished to the
extent financially feasible.'86 The court accepted the District's harsh
treatment'8 7 as a legitimate exercise of its fiscal responsibilities and held
that the closure was ultimately a political decision.
88
B. Section 504: Significant Leeway In the Provision of Services
While the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate'8 9 fully recognized
that section 504 was intended to end the treatment of the disabled that
"caused the handicapped to live among society 'shunted aside, hidden,
and ignored,' "I' the Alexander Court also noted that Congress did not
provide them with both individual counseling to instruct them as to where other services
were available and information regarding how to access such services. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id Also, the court assumed that the homeless disabled would seek out available
shelter. Nevertheless, the court noted that "given their personal limitations, physical,
mental, and economic, [the plaintiffs] were incapable of doing so." Id at 6.
187. The district had recently amended its Emergency Overnight Shelter Act of 1984
and, in doing so, significantly reduced the existing program providing shelters and services.
Id at 3, 6. Unlike the original Act, the amendments ensured that emergency shelter would
no longer be considered an entitlement. Id. at 3.
188. The Johnson court stated that "[i]t has, by its elected officials, made a governmen-
tal judgment to assign the homeless a lesser priority than they may have had in the past,
and it appears to have the right to do so without any judicial second-guessing, at least by
the federal judiciary." Id. at 6. The court quoted Judge Bork, in Williams v. Barry, 708
F.2d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1983):
"The Mayor is an elected official and his decision on shelters is a political one.
From the beginning of judicial review it has been understood that such decisions
need not be surrounded and hemmed in with judicially imposed processes. In-
deed, the reasons for judges not interfering with the methods by which political
decisions are arrived at are closely akin, if not identical, to the considerations
underlying the political question doctrine, a doctrine which denies the courts ju-
risdiction even to enter into certain areas."
Id
189. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
190. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295-96 (citing 117 CONG. REc. 45974 (1971) (statement of
Rep. Vanik introducing the predecessor of section 504 to the House of Representatives));
see also 118 CONG. REc. 525-26 (1972) (describing Senator Humphrey's belief that the
invisibility of the disabled in America should no longer be tolerated); 119 CONG. REC.
5880, 5883 (1973) (describing Senator Cranston's contention that the Act's purpose is to
redress the previously neglected disabled).
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intend to require states or local governments to provide services.' 9'
Rather, Congress' intent was to ensure that services were not adminis-
tered in a discriminatory fashion' 92-intent that plays a significant role in
section 504 claims regarding services provided to homeless, disabled
persons.
Another potential obstacle erected by the statutory language of section
504 is that discrimination, whether intentional or by disparate impact,
must be based solely on the disability. 93 Concerns such as budgetary
constraints, property values, or zoning issues, however, defend most gov-
ernmental decisions regarding the reduction or elimination of services,
the geographical siting of shelters or day centers, and other actions that
affect services to the homeless disabled. 94 Unless proffered governmen-
tal interests are clearly pretextual, a claim will fail because the courts give
significant leeway to government decisions pertaining to the provision for
and siting of services for the disabled and the homeless.'95
1. "Unmeaningful" Access: Judicial Reluctance to Interfere with
"Political and Budgetary" Decision Making
Both the types of services available and the physical and geographical
accessibility of services to the disabled comprises "access to services.'
1 9 6
When a community opposes the siting of a shelter or day center, local
officials respond in a number of ways. They either invoke discriminatory
zoning measures, tie available funding to where such shelters or day cen-
ters will be sited, or reduce or eliminate services. 197 These actions inten-
191. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 303-07; see also Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Of-
fice of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447, 452-54 (Mass. 1993) (stating that neither the ADA
nor section 504 require that deinstitutionalized persons be given integrated residential
placement or provided with specific services). It is also important to recall that the Alexan-
der Court limited the manner in which reasonable accommodation be demanded even if
discriminatory intent or disparate impact is found. See supra notes to 82-87 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the balance struck by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate
between the statutory rights of the disabled and the integrity of public services and
programs).
192. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 303-07.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the Second Circuit's approach to determining whether the discrimination is based solely on
the disability).
194. Collier, supra note 1, at 10.
195. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 308-09; P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir.
1990); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th
Cir. 1980).
196. Such access is fundamental to the homeless disabled. BAUM & BURNrS, supra
note 2, at 184.
197. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (exemplifying the elimi-
nation of services for the homeless).
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tionally discriminate against disabled persons and have an adverse
impact. Only a few cases have been brought under section 504 regarding
shelter services.19 Cases brought attacking state services for those dis-
abled persons who have become homeless as a result of insufficient social
services and residential placement reveal that section 504 does not hold
much promise for challenging actions directed at shelters and day
centers. 199
With regard to the availability of governmental services, the Alexander
Court made clear that section 504 does not mandate that the government
provide services. 2°° If such services are provided, the administration of
such services must be nondiscriminatory.2°' It is reasonable to recognize
that the disabled population has different needs and that a balancing is
necessary to keep section 504 within "manageable bounds., 20 2 The Alex-
ander opinion, however, has resulted in a split among the courts concern-
ing the understanding of differential treatment.20 3 This causes confusion
concerning section 504's application to disparities in services provided for
the disabled. °' A significant number of courts have interpreted Alexan-
der to mean that section 504 does not apply to the differential treatment
between classes of disabled persons, but only to differential treatment be-
198. Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447
(Mass. 1993) (holding that a claim brought under Title II extended section 504 coverage to
public services and programs not receiving federal financial assistance); Johnson, 786 F.
Supp. at 1 (discussing the sole issue of the plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim).
199. P.C., 913 F.2d at 1041 (striking down a mildly mentally disabled man's section 504
claim while noting that section 504 does not obligate the state to provide even-handed
treatment among the disabled); Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 447 (striking down two claims
under section 504).
200. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303-06 (1985).
201. Id
202. Id at 299.
203. See, e.g., P.C., 913 F.2d at 1041 (stating that section 504 does not obligate the state
to provide even-handed treatment among the disabled); Flight v. Gloeckler, No. 93-CV-
1206 (FJS) (GJD), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1995) (stating that it
is doubtful that Congress intended section 504 to allow claims for discrimination vis-a-vis
other disabled persons); Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 454 (stating that the focus of the federal
disabilities laws is discrimination between the disabled and non-disabled, rather than dispa-
rate treatment among the disabled). But see, e.g., McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F. Supp. 99,
114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that a claim challenging a disparity in benefits provided to
one class of disabled compared to another can be sustained under section 504); Clark v.
Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 692 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that discrimination vis-a-vis other
disabled persons is cognizable under section 504), aff'd, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 962 (1986); Goebel v. Colorado Dep't of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo.
1988) (recognizing a section 504 claim by persons who allegedly were deprived of commu-
nity mental health services as a result of their more severe impairments).
204. See supra note 203.
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tween disabled and non-disabled persons.2 °5 Others, however, have held
that differential treatment among classes of disabled persons is accounta-
ble under section 504.2° Such a significant split renders uncertain any
challenge to a government's reduction of services to the homeless.2 7
205. See P.C., 913 F.2d at 1041; Flight, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *5; Williams, 609
N.E.2d at 454.
206. McGuire, 734 F. Supp. at 114-15; Clark, 613 F. Supp. at 692 n.6; Goebel, 764 P.2d
at 804.
207. For example, in Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that while section 504 did not require the provision of additional serv-
ices to the disabled to "bring the handicapped up to the level of normal," it did require the
State to ensure that persons with more severe mental illnesses received full access to com-
munity services. Goebel, 764 P.2d at 805-06 (quoting Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397,
1409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 973 U.S. 906 (1985)). The State had been providing lesser
services to persons with more severe disabilities within a particular region of the state. Id.
at 791. The court found that the state's administration of services was "both overtly and
covertly selective and discriminatory" and overturned the trial court's "inexplicabl[e]" dis-
missal of the section 504 claim. Id. at 803-04. Yet the Goebel court's sensitivity was tem-
pered by its instructions to the trial court to require the State "to make only those
accommodations reasonably necessary to assure meaningful access to the mental health
programs available in the [particular region] for those members of the plaintiff class who
can realize the benefits of such programs." Id. at 805-06. This guidance assured the trial
court significant discretion in responding to a section 504 violation. This decision dealt
with one of several related and complicated suits that plaintiffs and others brought against
the same defendant. This author could locate neither a trial order or evidence of continued
court supervision pertaining to the Colorado Supreme Court's holding regarding the plain-
tiff's section 504 claim.
In Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, the Colorado Supreme Court, ironically, took the opposite
position in an opinion later withdrawn after rehearing the case and affirming the judgment
of the district court by operati as a result of an evenly divided court (one justice did not
participate). Duc Van Le v. lbarra, 843 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1992). In Duc Van Le, the State of
Colorado participated in a federal "Home and Community Based Services" program which
extended services to its elderly, blind, and physically or mentally disabled population, but
not to its mentally ill population. Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91-5SC189, 1992 Colo. LEXIS
385, at *14, 36 (Colo. Apr. 20, 1992), reh'g granted, op. withdrawn, No. 91SC189 1992 Colo.
LEXIS 447 (Colo. May 28, 1992). The Colorado Supreme Court held that such differential
treatment was permissible because the State, by deciding not to request federal funds foK
the participation of the mentally ill, was "not in a position to accept or reject the obliga-
tions of section 504," and therefore, "the nondiscrimination provision of section 504 was
not triggered." Id at *36-37. The trial court held that Colorado's decision not to seek
funds for this select class of disabled was impermissible differential treatment. See id at
*14-16. The lower court rejected the State's defense of "scarce public dollars" in light of
the availability of federal funds. Id. at *16. Yet, the State's highest court apparently found
that the state's decision itself was not a violation of section 504. Id. at *36.
It is difficult to reconcile the court's willingness to find disparate treatment of the more
severely mentally ill compared to the less mentally ill in Goebel with its initial reluctance to
do so in Duc Van Le with regard to the mentally ill as a class compared to the physically
and mentally disabled. This inconsistency is troublesome particularly when state funds
were not at issue in Duc Van Le. Duc Van Le, 1992 Colo. LEXIS 385, at *36.
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Section 504 claims concerning siting of services also have resulted in
inconsistent findings.2'8 Thus far, such claims have addressed the closure
and relocation of hospitals and medical services. 2' In Jackson v. Con-
way,210 the plaintiffs challenged the closure of an urban hospital and the
siting of consolidated medical services in a suburban facility, asserting
that the move denied the disabled access to local government medical
benefits and services.21' The court held, however, that the plaintiffs
failed to provide sufficient evidence that the lack of proximity alone cre-
ated a greater barrier to services for the disabled, solely on the basis of
disability.212 The court further stated that even if such evidence had been
offered, the defendants would have prevailed in light of the costs saved
from the consolidation and improvement of services at the suburban
facility.
213
The courts' reasoning behind their refusal to find a section 504 viola-
tion can easily defeat a claim on behalf of shelters and services. Local
governments can justify the reduction or relocation of shelters and serv-
ices for the homeless on a number of grounds. First, they may claim that
no obligation exists to provide such services2 14 or that they decided to
relocate the shelters or services so as to assist homeless persons in a dif-
ferent district or neighborhood. 215 Alternatively, they may rely on the
assumption that homeless persons, as an undifferentiated whole, will seek
out the new site.21 6 Such rationales perpetuate the presumption that the
homeless disabled will go to where services are made available. This pre-
sumption fosters communities' fears of becoming magnets for such
208. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd,
657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd,
620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980).
209. See Wilmington Medical Center, 491 F. Supp. at 291; Jackson, 476 F. Supp. at 898.
210. 476 F. Supp. 896.
211. Id. at 905.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Traynor v. Trunage, 485 U.S. 535 (1987) (stating that "nothing in the Rehabili-
tation Act ... requires that any benefit extended to one category of [disabled] persons also
be extended to all other categories of [disabled] persons"); see also supra note 207 (regard-
ing the reasoning by which the Colorado Supreme Court initially rejected a section 504
claim alleging disparate treatment between categories of the disabled in Duc Van Le v.
Ibarra).
215. Jackson, 476 F. Supp. at 905.
216. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (providing an example of a court
refusing to recognize a discriminatory disparate impact on the homeless disabled by ac-
cepting the defendant's argument that other services may be available to the homeless
should they seek them out).
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groups and also fuels the growing desire to herd, isolate, and segregate
the homeless disabled.217
2. Linking Federal Financial Support to Services Provided
Two issues arise when attempting to directly challenge the provision of
services by local government. First, the service or program must be
linked to federal funds because section 504 reaches only recipients of fed-
eral assistance.218 Second, courts generally are reluctant to interfere with
local fiscal decision making.
219
Local governments can and do exercise influence over the location of
shelters and services provided by private parties.220 Even though private
parties may receive local government support, it may be difficult to estab-
lish a connection between that local financial support and general federal
funds that the local government receive.221 Congress addressed this diffi-
culty in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which amended section
504's definition of "program or activity" receiving federal assistance.222
The amended definition covers all operations of a state or local govern-
217. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text (discussing two major presumptions
that perpetuate the segregation and isolation of the homeless disabled).
218. Melton v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, No. 93-0757, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12235, at *11-14 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1993); Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 715 F. Supp.
222, 225-26 (N.D. I11. 1989).
219. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d
1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1991); Williams v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447, 452-53 (Mass. 1993)
(exemplifying the court's reluctance to interfere with budgetary decisions as it relates to
community based services).
220. See, e.g., Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 929-30 (N.Y.
1991) (village attempting to prevent the operation of a residential substance abuse treat-
ment program in a former hotel by arguing that its use as a residential facility was not
permitted in the commercial zone in which the former hotel was located); see also Terry
Rice, Zoning and Land Use, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 615, 628-30 (1992) (discussing Nyack
and the degree of local government control over the siting of private services); supra note
32 (citing cases where local governments attempt to control siting through their zoning
laws).
221. Melton, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12235, at *11-18; Schroeder, 715 F. Supp. at 225-26.
222. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)). This amendment was a response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), restricting the
reach of Title IX, which covers gender discrimination in any education program receiving
federal assistance. § 2(1), 102 Stat. at 28. The Act amended all federal antidiscrimination
laws triggered by the receipt of federal assistance. Preamble, 102 Stat. at 28 (stating that
the Act "restore[s] the broad scope of coverage and clarifqies] the application of title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"); see also Schroe-
der, 715 F. Supp. at 225. The purpose of the Act is "to restore the prior consistent and
long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of
those laws as previously amended." § 2(2), 102 Stat. at 28.
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ment department or agency, as well as any state or local government en-
tity that distributes or receives federal assistance, and any part of which
receives federal assistance.223 This amended definition alleviates much of
the difficulty in establishing a link to federal funds to enjoy the protection
afforded under section 504.224
If federal funds do support local governmental services, it may be im-
possible to prove that local governmental actions violated conditions at-
tached to federal funds.225 Again, courts are reluctant to interfere not
only with local government actions and policies regarding general zoning
or budgetary issues, but also with "political" decision making that relates
to the homeless. 26
III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II REMAINS AN
ELUSIVE TOOL
A. Title II Carries the Barriers Erected Under Section 504
TWo of the most recent Title II challenges to discriminatory govern-
mental acts reveal that Title II has not remedied the shortcomings of sec-
tion 504 with regard to public services and programs. In Williams v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services,227 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the ADA did not require the State's Depart-
ment of Mental Health to provide residential placement and services to
the more severely mentally disabled.22 Due to the absence of such serv-
ices, individuals became homeless upon discharge from mental health fa-
cilities operated by Massachusetts's Department of Mental Health.
229
223. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
224. But cf Schroeder, 715 F. Supp. at 225 (finding that the definition of "program or
activity" did not encompass the City of Chicago, itself, but rather a department, agency or
entity of that municipality receiving federal funds).
225. See supra note 207 (regarding the reasoning employed by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Duc Van Le v. barra).
226. See Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1991) (providing an example of
judicial reluctance to interfere with budgetary decision making and thus refusal to find
violations of the disabilities laws when access to services are reduced); see also Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 308-09 (1984) (warning that provision of services necessary to
accommodate the disabled must be kept within reasonable administrative and fiscal
bounds); Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447,
452-53 (Mass. 1993) (noting that the Alexander Court rejected the argument that section
504 restricted state discretion in determining the "proper mix of amount, scope, and dura-
tional limitations on State-funded services").
227. 609 N.E.2d at 447.
228. Id at 454-55. The plaintiffs suffered from severe multiple disabilities, including
mental illness and substance abuse, and required significant support outside of psychiatric
institutions. Id. at 451-52.
229. Id. at 453-55.
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The court also held that the ADA did not require even-handed treatment
within the disabled population.230 Thus, the ADA did not mandate the
state to provide integrated residential placement when it chose to offer
this service.23 l The court reasoned that because the ADA did not require
services that the state already provided to the general mentally disabled
population, the state was free to provide lesser services to those more
severely disabled without violating the federal disabilities laws.232
A Pennsylvania federal district court in Helen L. v. Albert Didario
213
followed the "separation of powers" 2 4 reasoning that the Massachusetts
Supreme Court employed in Williams. 235 In Helen L., the plaintiffs chal-
lenged a state agency's refusal to provide attendant care services that
would permit plaintiffs to live at home in their communities rather than in
a nursing home for the disabled.23s The plaintiffs argued that this refusal
violated the integration mandate of Title 11.217 The state agency argued
that it complied with Title II as long as the plaintiffs received benefits for
which they qualified.238
Guided by the reasoning of Williams, the court agreed that the ADA
does not mandate the provision of services in an integrated setting.
239
Furthermore, the court, based on the separation of powers reasoning in-
voked in Williams, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the provision of
services in an integrated setting would be of a greater benefit to the plain-
tiffs.240 Finally, the court held that the state's denial of services was based
on a lack of funds, not on disability." Ironically, the state agency con-
230. Id. at 454.
231. Id. at 452-53. Thus, the state was essentially left free to perpetuate the segregation
of its disabled population. Id
232. Id.
233. No. 92-6054, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 595 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
234. Helen L., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 595, at *16.
235. Id at *16.
236. Id. at *11-12.
237. Id The plaintiffs argued that although the state provided essentially the same
services through two different methods, Title II requires that "those services [be furnished]
in the setting that best integrates plaintiffs into their community." Id. The plaintiffs were
eligible for attendant care service, yet had been informed that the state lacked the funds to
provide this service. Id. at *7. The state agency conceded, however, that providing the
plaintiffs with attendant care would cost significantly less than maintaining their current
care in the nursing home. Id. at *8-9. The cost for the nursing home care provided was
$45,000, 56% of which federal reimbursement covered. Id. Federal reimbursement fully
covered the cost for the requested attendant care service that totaled $10,500. Id.
238. Id. at *13. The state agency further argued that the courts "cannot otherwise dic-
tate how defendants provide those services." Id.
239. Id. at *13-14.
240. Id at *16. The defendant conceded that it was "less salutary for plaintiffs to re-
main in a nursing home rather than receive attendant care services." Id.
241. Id. at *15.
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ceded that the integrated service would be a cost-saving benefit for the
state.242
Judicial interpretation of Title II has not lessened the judicially im-
posed barriers under section 504. The courts' continued insensitivity to
the adverse impact of policy decisions on the disabled preclude fulfilling
the goal of ending segregation of the disabled.243 Furthermore, the sepa-
ration of powers reasoning, as exemplified in Johnson, Williams, and
Helen L. provides the courts with a convenient justification for refusing
to enforce section 504 or Title II with regard to access or integration.2
B. Challenging Acts of Intimidation or Coercion Directed at Private
Shelters and Services for the Homeless
Title II offers a possible approach to challenge government actions that
are directed against private sector shelters and day centers.245 Title II
may also offer protection against a government that denies that its finan-
cial support of such facilities makes the program a "public service" under
Title II.
24 6
Like the FHA, which reaches local governments that interfere with an
individual's right to housing,247 Title II also expressly prohibits public en-
tities from intimidating or coercing those who provide services to the dis-
abled and also prohibits policies or practices of public entities that
interfere with disabled persons' rights provided under the ADA, or with
access to services provided by the private or charitable sector.248 Thus, a
242. Id. at *12, 15-16; see supra note 237 (discussing funding for the attendant care
services).
243. Helen L., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16.
244. Judge Patricia M. Wald, Ten Admonitions for Legal Services Advocates Contem-
plating Federal Litigation, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May 1993, at 11, 16. Judge Wald, who
sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, traces this
development of judicial resistance to the Supreme Court's holding in Heckler v. Cheney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985). She noted that the lower courts have broadened the holding's scope
so as to create a formidable obstacle to challenges of government decisions and policies.
Id. Judge Wald refers to several cases relating to homeless shelters and services which
arose on her circuit as examples. Id. at 11-12.
245. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.130(g), 35.134(b) (1994).
246. See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text (discussing section 504's require-
ment that services or programs be linked to federal funds in order to trigger section 504's
anti-discrimination provisions and providing examples that local governmental aid to
homeless shelters may not be sufficient to deem them "public services" under section 504
or the ADA).
247. See supra note 32. Note that the prohibition clauses regarding acts of intimidation,
coercion or interference under the ADA are modeled after those found in regulations
promulgated under the FHA. ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 111-54.
248. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g), 35.134(b) (1994). Private individuals or entities that act to
prevent access to services can also be reached by the ADA under Title III. 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.206(b) (1994); see also ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 111-55. The Department
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Title II claim could challenge local government measures to prevent or
control the siting of shelters in response to community opposition.
Selective zoning enforcement is one common method of obstructing
group homes for the disabled.249 Likewise, local governments usually
of Justice gives the following example to illustrate the reach of the prohibitionary clauses
regarding retaliation or coercion under Title III: "[I]t would be a violation of the Act and
this part for a private individual, e.g., a restaurant customer, to harass or intimidate an
individual with a disability in an effort to prevent that individual from patronizing the
restaurant." ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at II1-55.
The following is an example of how a Title III claim may be used both to defend against
community legal actions directed at shelters and day centers as well as a weapon against
such acts of intimidation. In Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Episcopal Community
Servs., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985), a neighborhood association successfully closed down a
church center providing meals to the homeless on the ground that it posed a public nui-
sance. Id. at 915. While the court recognized the value of the Center's charitable enter-
prise, it stated that it did not "believe that the law allows the cost of a charitable enterprise
to be visited in their entirety upon the residents of a single neighborhood. The problems of
dealing with the unemployed, homeless and the mentally ill are also matters of community
or governmental responsibility." Id. at 921.
This scenario exemplifies the tension between service providers and the communities in
which such services are sited. This also serves as an example of when a countervailing
pressure point could be introduced under Title III. A community may intend to close or
prevent a center or shelter siting through the dissemination of literature opposing the facil-
ity or lawsuits intended to interfere with access to programs or accommodations provided
by private or charitable initiative. Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v.
Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 96, 99 (D.P.R. 1990) (where a neighborhood
association expressed opposition to a facility for persons with AIDS via petitions, graffiti,
picket lines, letters to public officials, an administrative complaint, local court action and
local television appearances); Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n., 712 P.2d at 915 (where a
neighborhood association filed a public nuisance suit to enjoin the operation of a church
meal program for the homeless). Local residents may also take such action to intimidate
disabled individuals and those persons attempting to provide them with public accommo-
dations. See, e.g., People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132,
1133 (E.D. Va. 1992). In People Helpers Foundation, a neighbor to a group home allegedly
attempted to intimidate the private provider by organizing in a threatening manner in front
of the house with other neighbors, while volunteers assisted residents move into the facil-
ity, and by taking photographs of the residents and the volunteers. Id Recent FHA in-
vestigations by the Department of Housing and Urban Development of private individuals
or entities opposed to group homes for the homeless disabled, however, have come under
fire due to First Amendment concerns. See Guy Gugliotta, ACLU Alleges Free Speech
Violations in HUD Probes, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1994, at A20; Nat Hentoff, HUD's At-
tack on the First Amendment, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at A15; U.S. May Sue Foes of
Plan for the Homeless, N.Y. TImnS, July 31, 1994, sec. 1, at 18. As a result, HUD has issued
proposed guidelines that forbid investigation of persons who oppose facilities for the
homeless disabled if the actions taken fall under the umbrella of "petitioning the local
government." James H. Andrews, U.S. Housing Agency to Issue Guidelines Protecting Free
Speech in Bias Probe, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, Sept. 1, 1994, at 3. The guidelines, how-
ever, would still permit investigations when such private individuals or groups initiate law-
suits. Id.
249. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing examples of selective zoning en-
forcement employed to obstruct siting of group homes for the disabled).
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employ this method to prevent or control the siting of shelters or day
centers. 250 Under Title II, a claim could be brought against a local zoning
board or agency for its policies or decisions that are designed to control
or preclude the siting of a shelter or service in response to community
animus.2 5 1
Furthermore, many private and charitable initiatives depend on the lar-
gesse of government, whether in the form of facilitating federal grants
252
or providing buildings for nominal rent.253 Therefore, such initiatives are
vulnerable to government's coercive measures that tie support to siting
and thus dictate the location of such services. Title II prohibits practices
that intimidate those individuals that attempt to provide public accommo-
dations to disabled individuals.254 Thus, when public financial assistance
does not rise to the level of contracting out public services, Title II could
provide the grounds to challenge measures that are intended to prevent
or control the charitable or private services or shelter. 5
The legal analysis brought to such discriminatory or coercive acts under
the FHA could be applied to claims brought under Title II, assuming that
plaintiffs can overcome certain difficulties in presenting a claim. For ex-
ample, it remains difficult for plaintiffs to prove not only that the govern-
ment took such coercive measures to pacify other community or business
interests, but also that animus towards those homeless disabled persons
to be served by the program motivated community opposition.256 Judi-
cial sensitivity to the characterization of the homeless disabled would al-
low Title II to fully blossom as a weapon to counteract such local
government manipulation.257 As revealed in the judicial treatment of dis-
250. Robert Barker, Mental Health Center Gets Eviction Notice, L.A. TIMES (Orange
County), Jan. 7, 1993, at B2, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; Franklin,
supra note 8, at 7B; Stewart, supra note 17, at 8.
251. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g).
252. See ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at II1-30.
253. See Melton v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, No. 93-0757, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12235, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 1993). The District of Columbia rented a building
for use as a shelter to the CCNV for one dollar per year and provided other benefits to the
shelter. Id. Such support, however, does not raise it to the level of treating the shelter as a
public service or program under Title II. I&
254. 28 C.F.R. § 35.134(b) (1994).
255. Id; see ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 11-52, 111-30.
256. See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of proving
that governmental actions were taken in response to community animus towards disabili-
ties most common among the homeless, opposed to animus towards the homeless in
general).
257. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text (discussing the analytical approach
taken in FHA cases and providing an examples of the judicial sensitivity to the stereotypi-
cal perceptions of the disabled held by communities opposed to housing for the disabled).
The court in Seide v. Provost, 536 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), exemplifies the level of
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ability claims under section 504 and Title II thus far, a significant number
of courts remain insensitive to what may superficially appear to be class
animus, but is in fact animus against those with disabilities such as mental
illness or substance addiction-disabilities most common among the
homeless population.258
IV. JUDICIAL SENSITIVITY TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DISABILITY AND HOMELESSNESS Is NECESSARY
Homeless individuals with disabilities are members of a protected class
under the federal disabilities laws.2 59 The homeless, disabled population,
however, faces significant difficulties when it seeks court protection under
these laws.260 The case law that has evolved in the area of housing reveals
that the FHA is a strong weapon against governmental officials' discrimi-
understanding that could be brought to disability claims of the homeless population by the
judicial branch. Id. at 1125. District Judge Sweet, writing for the court, noted that the
court was confronted by a dispute between a city homeless shelter and a state psychiatric
hospital, and he thus stated:
I am compelled to note the poignancy of the position of these populations, each
to a very large extent the product of the swift, conflicting currents of our society,
each without a political constituency to which they can refer their suffering, each
driven to resort to the courts for enforcement... to achieve humane treatment at
the hands of the society. While the impropriety of judges determining social pol-
icy is frequently sounded by those with loud trumpets, nonetheless, in the context
of the needs of the homeless and the mentally disturbed, it is the court that must
decide the issues brought before it and seek to achieve a just result and do so
promptly. Despite the intricacy of the social issues involved, I conclude that here
as in other areas, it is better to have a court resolution than none at all.
Id
In Seide, members of the Board of Visitors of a psychiatric hospital argued that psychiat-
ric patients had a constitutional right to safety while in the custody of the state. I at
1134-35. The members asserted that the plans of the city government to expand an existing
shelter in close proximity to a psychiatric hospital posed a safety risk to the hospital's
patients. Id Fifty percent of the total population of shelter users, including those who used
the shelter in question, had a history of mental illness and hospitalization. Id. at 1128-29.
As the court noted, "the mentally disturbed and the homeless, although not incarcerated,
have been rejected by the community of the City and are now pitted against one another in
a contest for the isolated turf of Ward's Island." Id at 1125. The court held that sufficient
security existed to ensure the safety of the institutionalized patients, and that the presence
of the shelter in close proximity did not curtail the patients' care. Id at 1137.
258. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing the split among the fed-
eral courts regarding differential treatment among classes of disabled, and that refusal to
recognize discriminatory treatment among such classes is often based on budgetary deci-
sion making). As a result, a governmental response to community animus against the dis-
abled may remain buried under a rational distribution of funds argument.
259. See supra notes 109-43 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of recognized
disabilities).
260. See supra notes 148-53, 174-88, 199-207, 227-44 and accompanying text (analyzing
the barriers the disabled population faces under the FHA, section 504 and Title II).
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natory actions that are a response to community opposition to group
homes for the disabled, who also happen to be homeless or are in risk of
homelessness. 261 The federal courts have enforced vigilantly the FHA to
protect persons with disabilities, particularly those who find the least
sympathy from society.262 Under the FHA's current interpretation, how-
ever, the act has limited applicability to discrimination against the provi-
sion of shelters or day centers263 that are often the first link toward
rehabilitation programs, group homes, and permanent housing.264  The
FHA poses statutory barriers for persons who seek access to shelters and
day centers and impedes the nondiscriminatory siting of shelters or cen-
ters.265 Generally, the courts are unwilling to expand the definition of
"dwelling" to include such facilities.2 " Furthermore, the FHA cannot
protect homeless disabled persons because they are neither "buyers" nor
"renters," and the courts resist viewing them as "residents."267 The legal
analysis and judicial sensitivity that has developed under the FHA in the
group home context, however, could be extended to claims brought
under Title II.21 Such claims would be based on impermissible coercion,
intimidation and interference by a public agency or entity, which ulti-
mately deter or prevent the siting of private shelters and services for the
homeless.269
It is unlikely that the courts will increase their hospitality towards sec-
tion 504 or Title II claims brought by the homeless disabled with regard
to public shelters or services.270 Proving a nexus between community ani-
mus and perceived behavior of the homeless disabled is difficult.271 Even
if plaintiffs prove that community animus toward disabilities motivated
the local government's decision making, the local government could eas-
ily defeat a section 504 or Title II claim by arguing that budgetary con-
straints or selective treatment of the disabled population actually
261. See supra notes 32, 54 and accompanying text (discussing the court's treatment of
actions brought by disabled groups that have traditionally received little sympathy from
society).
262. Id
263. See supra notes 148-53, 174-88 and accompanying text (exploring the barriers to
bringing a successful action under the FHA).
264. See supra note 15.
265. See Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
266. Id at 4.
267. Id
268. See supra note 257 (discussing the judicial sensitivity exemplified in Seide v.
Provost).
269. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(g), 35.134(b) (1994).
270. See supra notes 199-244 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers and incon-
sistent rulings by the courts with respect to Title II and section 504 actions).
271. See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
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motivated the challenged reduction or resiting of services.272 Such a de-
fense will prevail because of the significant leeway that courts allow gov-
ernments to receive when providing services to the disabled population at
different levels.273 The courts fully sanction unequal treatment among
the disabled population, which results in isolation and segregation.274
Therefore, individuals who have disabilities that are more difficult to
treat or are less socially acceptable will rarely receive relief from discrimi-
nation.275 Going beyond Congress' intent that federal disabilities laws
should not force local and state governments to take affirmative action,
the courts have, in effect, erected a barrier based on the separation of
powers doctrine, which is well suited to avoid claims by the disabled who
are more difficult to treat and, particularly, the resulting homeless
disabled.276
V. CONCLUSION
For a majority of the homeless disabled, the first step towards reaching
a group home is connecting with services located in shelters that target
272. See, e.g., P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that sec-
tion 504 did not obligate the defendant to meet the plaintiff's needs vis-a-vis other disabled
individuals); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Md. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680
(8th Cir. 1980); (noting that consolidation of healthcare facilities resulted in improved care
and cost-saving) Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs, 609 N.E.2d
447, 452-53 (Mass. 1993) (stating that the ADA does not require a state to provide services
in the first place, thus it may selectively offer integrated residential placement). The
courts' continued insensitivity to the regime of segregation and isolation of the disabled
produced by public administration of services remains. See Helen L. v. Didario, No. 92-
6054, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 595, at *15 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Cook, supra note 57, at
394-95 (noting that section 504 has succeeded in reducing physical barriers to access and
ensuring provision of auxiliary aids, yet, the courts permit segregation and isolation of the
disabled in the context of the provision of residential and community services). While a
major distinction between Title II and section 504 is that federal financial assistance is not
necessary to trigger Title II coverage, the substantive analysis of claims brought under Title
II continues to follow section 504. Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 452-53; see also ADA HAND-
BOOK, supra note 102, at II-11 (stating that Title II standards are generally equivalent to
those adopted under section 504).
273. Cf Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 308-09 (1984); Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F.
Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1991); Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 452-53.
274. See supra note 203.
275. See, e.g., P.C., 913 F.2d at 1041-42; Johnson, 786 F. Supp. at 6; Williams, 609
N.E.2d at 454-57.
276. See, e.g., Johnson, 786 F. Supp. at 6 (stating that the decision to close shelters is
solely a political one); Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 454 (stating that the courts are not responsi-
ble for determining whether the provision of services or the allocation of resources is ap-
propriate, thus, disparate allocation of resources among the disabled is insufficient to
demonstrate a violation of the ADA); see also supra note 244 and accompanying text (not-
ing Judge Wald's concern with the "separation of powers" doctrine as it is applied to the
allocation of services and resources).
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persons with mental illness, alcoholism and drug addiction. Under cur-
rent case law, if government action deprives or interferes with the right of
a homeless disabled person to reside in a group home, the court focuses
on whether such governmental action is in response to the disability. Yet,
when governmental actions to deter a shelter's establishment deprive the
same person of the opportunity to find a shelter and its supportive serv-
ices, the focus shifts away from the person's disability to concerns of pro-
tecting the integrity of a locality's zoning system, property rights and
public fiscal demands. In sum, the focus shifts to issues of class animus,
not disability. The provision of shelter and services in an integrated and
fair manner also has been denied under the guise of the "separation of
powers" doctrine that the courts have erected. The judiciary must be
willing to view homelessness not as a class issue, but as an outgrowth of
the disability itself and the public and private sectors's resistance to con-
front the failure of community placement programs that were to follow
deinstitutionalization.
One clear message of the legislative histories of the FHA, section 504
and the ADA is that the judicial branch must protect the disabled from
indifference, ignorance, benign neglect and majority decision making
based on stereotypes and fears about persons with disabilities. Yet, the
federal disabilities laws are not protecting the most vulnerable members
of our disabled population from community animus exercised through
their elected officials. It is essential for the judiciary to gain greater sensi-
tivity and to begin to aggressively enforce the federal disability laws in
order to protect society's most vulnerable citizens.
Alicia Hancock Apfel
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